ARTICLE

REUNITING ‘IS’ AND ‘OUGHT’ IN EMPIRICAL LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP

JOSHUA B. FISCHMAN†
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 118
I. RELATING THE MEASURABLE TO THE GOOD ............................ 123
A. Normative Metrics ...................................................................... 123
B. Medical Research ........................................................................ 124
C. Economics .................................................................................. 126
D. Empirical Legal Scholarship .......................................................... 127
II. JUDICIAL CITATION COUNTS .................................................... 130
III. REVERSAL RATES ...................................................................... 139
IV. MEASURING THE RULE OF LAW: STUDIES OF INTERJUDGE
DISPARITY ................................................................................ 146
A. The Normative Implications of Disparity ........................................148
B. Consistency, Predictability, and Comparative Justice ........................149
C. Determinacy and Correctness ........................................................ 151
D. Conclusion.................................................................................. 153
V. BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN ‘IS’ AND ‘OUGHT’ ...................... 154
†Associate
Professor,
Northwestern
University
School
of
Law,
joshua.fischman@law.northwestern.edu. I thank David Abrams, Karen Alter, Robert Anderson,
Charles Barzun, Bernard Black, Miguel de Figueiredo, Shari Diamond, David Freeman Engstrom,
Tim Feddersen, Brandon Garrett, Jonah Gelbach, Michael Gilbert, Jim Greiner, Tara Grove,
Mitu Gulati, Toby Heytens, Josh Kleinfeld, Andrew Koppelman, Brian Leiter, Greg Mitchell,
Laura Pedraza-Fariña, Nicola Persico, Jim Pfander, J.J. Prescott, Corey Rayburn Yung, Ed Rubin,
Max Schanzenbach, David Schwartz, Micah Schwartzman, Scott Shapiro, Greg Sisk, Matthew
Stephenson, Sean Sullivan, and audiences at Vanderbilt Law School, Northwestern Law School,
the University of Illinois College of Law, and Michigan Law School for their helpful feedback.

(117)

118

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 162: 117

A.
B.
C.
D.

Prioritizing Normative Goals ........................................................ 154
Rethinking Empirical Legal Methodology ........................................ 158
Accomodating Subjective Phenomena ............................................. 161
Emphasizing Generalizable Results ................................................ 162
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................168

INTRODUCTION
A century ago, Roscoe Pound set forth his agenda for a “sociological
jurisprudence”1 that would study the “actual social effects of legal institutions and legal doctrines.”2 Pound sought to use empirical social science to
advance normative goals: he “regard[ed] law as a social institution which
may be improved by intelligent human effort” and proposed that social
science could “discover the best means of furthering and directing such
effort.”3 Two decades later, Karl Llewellyn issued his call for a “realistic
jurisprudence” that would use empirical social science to study the determinants and consequences of judicial decisions.4 Llewellyn was also motivated
by normative ends, believing that in order to investigate whether the “law
does what it ought,” one must “first answer what it is doing now.”5 Pound
and Llewellyn sparred over their respective visions,6 but it is important to
remember that they shared a common aim: to use empirical social science to
improve the law.
The early legal empiricists were mindful of the challenges of connecting
positive and normative approaches to legal scholarship. In his exchange with
Pound, Llewellyn famously called for a “temporary divorce of Is and
Ought.”7 He believed that the separation of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ was necessary
for scientific credibility, but that it must be temporary in order to serve the

1 See Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pts. 1-3), 24 HARV. L.
REV. 591 (1911); 25 HARV. L. REV. 140 (1912); 25 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1912) [hereinafter Pound,
Scope and Purpose].
2 Pound, Scope and Purpose (pt. 3), supra note 1, at 513.
3 Id. at 516.
4 See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431
(1930).
5 Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1222, 1223 (1931).
6 See id. at 1226-33; Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697
(1931); Llewellyn, supra note 4, at 433-35.
7 Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 1236.
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goals of legal reform.8 In the years that followed, however, legal empiricists
struggled to balance the competing demands of social science and legal
reform.9 Some failed to separate ‘is’ and ‘ought,’ allowing their normative
commitments to influence their factual findings.10 Others failed to reunite
‘is’ and ‘ought,’ producing “a mindless amassing of statistics without
reference to any guiding theory whatsoever.”11 Years later, a disillusioned
Llewellyn mocked his fellow realists for their pointless empirical projects.12
He wrote: “I read all the results, but I never dug out what most of the
counting was good for.”13
The early legal empiricists had worthy ambitions, but their accomplishments were meager.14 There were many reasons for their failure,15 but
prominent among them was their inability to develop any kind of theoretical framework for making their empirical findings relevant to normative

8 See id. at 1236-37 (arguing that “during the inquiry itself into what Is, the observation, the
description, and the establishment of relations between the things described are to remain as
largely as possible uncontaminated by the desires of the observer,” but that for those “who begin
with a suspicion that change is needed, a permanent divorce would be impossible”).
9 See, e.g., John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the
Yale Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 459, 539-45 (1979) (discussing the struggles faced by legal
realists at Yale Law School in balancing the methodological imperatives of social science with the
demands of progressive reform).
10 See id. at 540-45 (describing how several of the realists, most notably William O. Douglas,
abandoned the scientific method when it conflicted with their reform objectives).
11 S.N. Verdun-Jones, Cook, Oliphant, and Yntema: The Scientific Wing of American Legal Realism, 5 DALHOUSIE L.J. 3, 43 (1979).
12 See Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Makes Legal Research Worth While, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 399,
401 (1956) (describing studies by Walter Wheeler Cook and Herman Oliphant as “hastily
considered, ill-planned, mal-prepared . . . so-called research” and a study by Underhill Moore as
“the nadir of idiocy”).
13 Id. at 403.
14 See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 158 (1995) (“Legal realists made a good deal of fuss about bringing social sciences to the law schools. But they did
disappointingly little with such sciences once they had got them there.”); MORTON HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960 210 (1992) (“Virtually all [legal
historians] agree that most of the social science research projects undertaken by Realists were
either trivial attempts to prove the obvious through pseudo-scientific methodology or else naive
and misconceived efforts at social science research.”); Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal,
Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 205
(1943) (describing the realists’ empirical scholarship as producing “isolated and trivial results”);
Peter H. Schuck, Why Don’t Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323,
330 (1989) (noting that many of the early empiricists “regarded [their] projects largely as
failures”).
15 See Schlegel, supra note 9, at 460 (“[T]he Realists’ social scientific research died out because of the impermanence of the institutionalized circumstances in which it was undertaken, the
peculiarities of the personalities of the leaders of the undertaking, and the difficulties in matching
the impulse to do such research with the social science of the time.”).
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legal scholarship.16 Today, empirical legal scholarship is flourishing
again,17 and contemporary empiricists are far more sophisticated than their
predecessors. Many law professors now have advanced social science
training18 and employ sophisticated methodologies from other disciplines to
analyze and interpret data. Like the early empiricists, however, they are still
struggling to balance the methodological imperatives of social science with
the desire for legal reform. Often, the quest for scientific credibility leads
contemporary empiricists to lose sight of the normative goals of legal
scholarship. Some empirical studies make efforts to relate their findings to
normative questions about law, and some even offer policy prescriptions,
but such studies rarely explain how they derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’ Even
a cursory examination of the premises underlying such claims often reveals
them to be untenable.
Empirical research projects need not generate immediate prescriptions,
but even positive legal research should address topics that have some
importance for legal scholarship. Because the law is a normative practice
and exists to serve social purposes, determining what is important in legal
scholarship requires some reference to the normative goals of law.19 Thus,
any empirical research that purports to be relevant to legal scholarship
requires some framework for connecting ‘is’ and ‘ought.’
16 See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 19 (1995) (“The empirical projects of the
legal realists, which not only failed but in failing gave empirical research rather a bad name among
legal academics, illustrate the futility of empirical investigation severed from a theoretical
framework.”); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE 234 (1995) (describing the lack of “conceptual schema that could explain the results of
the Realist’s research”); Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence,
76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 311-12 (1997) (arguing that the problem with realism was not the lack of a
theoretical framework, but “rather adherence to a bad theoretical framework”); Llewellyn, supra
note 12, at 401 (“There was a rich and reeking failure . . . in finding ideas or words of common
ground to translate legal problems or phenomena into meaningfulness to the social disciplines or
to interpret social discipline concepts or methods into anything with meaning and appeal to men
of law.”); Verdun-Jones, supra note 11, at 43 (describing the failure of legal realists “to establish
even the most rudimentary conceptual framework capable of ordering empirical information into a
meaningful form”).
17 See Shari Seidman Diamond & Pam Mueller, Empirical Legal Scholarship in Law Reviews,
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 581, 590-91 (2010) (noting the growth of empirical scholarship in law
reviews between 1998 and 2008); Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal
Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 147 (2006) (documenting the increased use of
empirical terms in law review articles between 1994 and 2006); Michael Heise, An Empirical
Analysis of Empirical Legal Scholarship Production, 1990-2009, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1739, 1741-46
(documenting growth in empirical terms in law review titles).
18 See Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Law and Economics as a Pillar of Legal Education, 8
REV. L. & ECON. 487, 489 (2012) (reporting that 20% of faculty members at the 26 highest-ranked
law schools have a Ph.D. in a social science discipline).
19 See infra Section V.A.
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As Barry Friedman has prominently argued, empirical legal scholars
should “ask, at the outset of every project, why we . . . might care about
what is being studied.”20 Yet it is not enough to admonish legal empiricists
to pay more attention to normative implications. In many settings, there are
complex relationships between the phenomena that are readily measured
and the values that can justify legal reform. Intuition alone cannot suffice to
relate observable data to normative claims; legal scholarship needs conceptual frameworks and empirical methods that can bridge the gap between ‘is’
and ‘ought.’ Developing such frameworks will require a sustained agenda
that integrates empirical methodology with legal theory.
Part I of this Article begins by considering how other disciplines have
developed methods for relating quantitative empirical findings to normative
claims. Typically, this is accomplished by formulating a normative metric
that quantifies the goodness of the results. Using medicine and economics
as examples, Part I shows how scholars in these disciplines have developed
frameworks and methods for connecting the positive and the normative.
Empirical legal scholars, by contrast, often seek normative relevance by
examining measureable phenomena that have some intuitive but only
vaguely specified connection to a normative goal. Many studies simply
conflate the measureable with the good, justifying policy proposals on the
basis of the measureable objects. Parts II–IV provide illustrations of this
approach for three commonly discussed judicial statistics. Part II focuses on
judicial citation counts, Part III examines reversal rates, and Part IV
critiques measures of interjudge disparity. These statistics are often used in
empirical legal scholarship to capture conceptions of good judicial decisionmaking, and all three have been used to justify bold policy proposals.
For example, scholars have argued that judicial citation counts should be
used to determine a shortlist for Supreme Court nominations,21 to assess the
merits of judicial selection procedures,22 to determine whether judges are

Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 262 (2006).
See Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 299, 300
(2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Tournament] (proposing a citation count–based system for
evaluating judges “where the reward to the winner is elevation to the Supreme Court”); Stephen
J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge
Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 34 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking]
(explaining how judicial citation counts can be used to select Supreme Court nominees).
22 See Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an
Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 290, 326 (2008) (using citation
counts to compare the performance of appointed and elected state court judges).
20
21
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overpaid,23 and even to examine whether men or women make better
judges.24 Studies documenting interjudge disparities played a prominent
role in the enactment of the United States Sentencing Guidelines25 and
have also been used to justify reforms in Social Security26 and immigration
adjudication.27 Reversal rates have been cited in debates about whether to
split the Ninth Circuit28 and used to appraise reforms in immigration
adjudication.29 Because such measures lack intrinsic normative force,
however, policy arguments based on these measures alone are untenable.
These measures may well have some relevance to normative concerns, but
the studies are seldom explicit about their normative goals, how the data
relate to these goals, and what premises are needed to justify the conclusions.
Part V discusses ways that legal empiricists can bridge the gap between
‘is’ and ‘ought.’ Most fundamentally, legal empiricists need to prioritize
normative questions; research should focus on what is important, not what
is easily measureable. In addition, empiricists need to rethink some aspects
of empirical legal methodology. The choice of methods should be driven by
questions, not the other way around. Empiricists should not try to seek
objective, assumption-free conclusions, but rather should indicate how
findings can be combined with assumptions to generate meaningful conclusions. Finally, due to the nature of the questions that arise in legal scholarship and the limits of experimentation, legal scholars should pay more
attention to how their findings can generalize to new settings.

23 Stephen J. Choi et al., Are Judges Overpaid? A Skeptical Response to the Judicial Salary Debate, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 47, 67 (2009) (using citation counts to measure the impact of salaries on
judicial performance).
24 See Stephen J. Choi et al., Judging Women, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 504, 508 (2011)
(using citation counts to assess whether men or women make better judges).
25 See KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 104-12 (1998) (describing how empirical studies of sentencing
disparity played a prominent role in the enactment of the United States Sentencing Guidelines).
26 See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 22 (1983) (discussing reports that advocated reforms to address the failure of the
Social Security Administration “to manage the adjudication of claims in ways that produce
predictable and consistent outcomes”).
27 See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 295, 325-49 (2007) (documenting wide disparities among immigration judges in asylum
grant rates); id. at 378-89 (weighing various reforms for reducing the disparities).
28 See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 120-123 and accompanying text.

2013]

Reuniting ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’

123

I. RELATING THE MEASURABLE TO THE GOOD
Empirical research is inherently descriptive, yet legal scholarship is predominantly normative.30 Bridging the gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ therefore
requires some form of normative premise. When empirical legal scholars
seek to relate their empirical findings to normative claims about the law or
legal institutions, however, their claims often have vague, unstated foundations. There is frequently a striking contrast between the effort devoted to
making credible statistical inferences and the lax attitude toward articulating premises that can connect empirical findings to normative claims about
law.
The challenge of relating empirical findings to normative claims is hardly unique to legal scholarship. Many professional disciplines and applied
sciences—such as medicine, engineering, education, and environmental
studies—harness scientific knowledge in the pursuit of social purposes.
Although most empirical research in the social science disciplines is positive, the research questions of these disciplines are similarly motivated by
normative ends.
This Part discusses the use of normative metrics in disciplines other
than law. In some settings, the relevant metrics are directly measureable,
and the results are self-interpreting. This part then examines frameworks
for connecting ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in medical research and in economics, which
use more sophisticated theories and methods to relate empirical findings to
normative goals. In contrast to law, scholars in these disciplines are explicit
about how empirical findings are used to support normative claims.
A. Normative Metrics
In quantitative studies, a normative premise is typically formulated in
terms of a metric that maps states of the world into levels of goodness. A
function f would constitute an normative metric if f(A) > f(B) whenever
state A is preferred over state B. In economics, for example, the function f
typically represents economic surplus or some conception of social welfare.
Similarly, research on criminal justice might evaluate policing policies in
terms of crime rates,31 medical researchers examine health outcomes and

30 Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835,
1847 (1988) (“[T]he most distinctive feature of standard legal scholarship is its prescriptive
voice.”).
31 See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 270 (1997) ( f inding that an increase in the size of police forces
reduces violent crime).
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survival rates,32 and education research often examines academic achievement.33
Any policy claim derived from an empirical study is only as credible as
the normative metric that is employed. Justifying a metric requires two
steps. First, one needs a theory of the good. For example, the metrics
described above are premised on the desirability of low crime, economic
efficiency, good health, or academic achievement. These normative premises
are uncontroversial, even if there might be disagreement about how
tradeoffs should be made among competing goals.
Second, one needs to relate observable phenomena to the measure of
goodness. When good or bad outcomes are directly measurable—such as
when the outcomes of a medical trial are “survival” and “death”—the results
will be self-interpreting and no deeper theory is needed. If such a trial is
well controlled, simple statistical methods may be adequate to assess the
impact of a treatment and to justify prescriptive claims.
In many settings, however, the normative metric will not be directly
measureable, but rather must be inferred from other observable variables. In
these settings, more complex inferential methods and deeper theories are
needed to justify normative claims. The following Sections will discuss
concepts and methods that other disciplines have developed to relate
measureable outcomes to normative claims.
B. Medical Research
Medicine is a prominent example of a discipline that is both scientific
and prescriptive. Medical research uses scientific methods to examine the
effects of various treatments, but the practice of medicine has explicit
normative goals: the “diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of disease.”34
Thus, the commonly accepted metrics for evaluating medical treatments are
outcomes that represent “how a patient feels, functions, or survives.”35

32 See, e.g., Biomarkers Definitions Working Group, Biomarkers and Surrogate Endpoints: Preferred Definitions and Conceptual Framework, 69 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS
89, 91 (2001) (defining a “[c]linical endpoint . . . used in the assessment of the benefits and risks
of a therapeutic intervention” as “[a] characteristic or variable that reflects how a patient feels,
functions, or survives”).
33 See, e.g., Cecilia Elena Rouse, Private School Vouchers and Student Achievement: An Evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, 113 Q.J. ECON. 553 (1998) (examining the impact of
assignment to a private school on test scores in the context of a school voucher program).
34 NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1087 (3d ed. 2010).
35 Robert Temple, Are Surrogate Markers Adequate to Assess Cardiovascular Disease Drugs?, 282
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 790, 790 (1999).

2013]

Reuniting ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’

125

When these outcomes are directly measureable, the normative implications of a medical trial may be obvious. Often, however, these normatively
relevant outcomes cannot be readily measured, especially when the effects
of a treatment may not accrue until many years after the treatment is
administered. In such trials, medical researchers often use “surrogate
outcomes” to proxy for the clinically meaningful outcomes. For instance,
when the effect of a drug regimen on heart disease and life expectancy
might not be observed for many years, a study might examine whether the
drug regimen significantly reduces levels of blood cholesterol. Here, blood
cholesterol is a surrogate; it has no normative significance beyond its
tendency to promote coronary disease.
In this example, a treatment cannot be justified merely on the basis of
its estimated effect on cholesterol levels. To justify an intervention, any
surrogate measure must be validated by showing that an effect of the
treatment on the surrogate will correspond to an effect on a meaningful
clinical outcome. Validation of the surrogate measure requires two steps.
First, one must specify the clinical outcome that the surrogate is intended
to measure, such as survival, comfort, or functional capacity.36 Second, one
must explain the relationship between the surrogate and the clinical outcome and show how inferences about the former can facilitate inferences
about the latter. This step requires both a statistical association between the
surrogate and the clinical outcome and an understanding of the causal
relationship between the two.
Biostatisticians have developed a rich literature on the use of surrogate
measures, providing a variety of complex conditions under which surrogates
can be used to support inferences about true outcomes.37 In particular,
correlation between the surrogate and the true measure is not sufficient to
justify the use of a surrogate in a clinical trial.38 Often, there may be
multiple causal pathways between a disease and a true clinical outcome,
only one of which is captured by the surrogate measure. In such a situation,
See id.
See, e.g., Marc Buyse & Geert Molenberghs, Criteria for the Validation of Surrogate Endpoints in Randomized Experiments, 54 BIOMETRICS 1014, 1014-16 (1998) (discussing criteria for the
proper use of surrogates in clinical studies); Thomas R. Fleming & David L. DeMets, Surrogate
End Points in Clinical Trials: Are We Being Misled?, 125 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 605, 605-06
(1996) (same); Ross L. Prentice, Surrogate Endpoints in Clinical Trials: Definition and Operational
Criteria, 8 STAT. MED. 431, 431-32 (1989) (same). See generally THE EVALUATION OF SURROGATE
ENDPOINTS (Tomasz Burzykowski et al. eds., 2005) (discussing the use and validation of
surrogates in a variety of contexts).
38 See Stuart G. Baker & Barnett S. Kramer, A Perfect Correlate Does Not a Surrogate Make, 3
BMC MED. RES. METHODOLOGY, no. 16, 2003, at 2-3 (“[P]erfect correlation does not guarantee
correct inference when a potential surrogate endpoint replaces a true endpoint.”).
36
37
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measuring the impact of a treatment on the surrogate will fail to capture the
impact of the treatment on the true outcome.39
For example, it would be infeasible to measure the effectiveness of
youth anti-smoking programs by examining the proportion of treated youth
who die prematurely from lung cancer. Researchers might instead use
subsequent smoking behavior as a surrogate for premature lung cancer
death.40 Similarly, reduction in tumor size might be a valid surrogate for
survival rates in estimating the impact of chemotherapy regimens on lung
cancer patients. Both cigarette smoking and tumor size are highly correlated
with lung cancer deaths, and both have a direct causal impact. But smoking
rates could not be used as a surrogate for measuring the effectiveness of
chemotherapy, and tumor size could not be used as a surrogate for antismoking campaigns.41
In a number of instances, drugs have been approved on the basis of their
effect on surrogate measures but were subsequently discovered to have
harmful effects on clinical outcomes.42 As these experiences show, the
relationship between surrogates and meaningful outcomes cannot simply be
asserted, but must be carefully scrutinized. Understanding the causal
relationship between medical interventions, surrogates, and clinically
meaningful outcomes is essential to the validation of any surrogate measure.
C. Economics
Economics, like many of the social sciences, combines positive research
with normative goals. Economists study the production, consumption, and
distribution of goods and services, but scholarship in economics is not
merely motivated by idle curiosity about producers, consumers, and markets. Rather, the study of economics is motivated by an understanding that
economic activity serves social purposes and that certain policies may
advance or hinder those purposes.
Empirical economists often have access to voluminous data on prices
and levels of output for goods in various markets. Such data, however,
typically have no intrinsic normative significance; one would not justify a
39 See Fleming & DeMets, supra note 37, at 605-06 (illustrating how a surrogate endpoint
might not reflect a true clinical outcome).
40 See Prentice, supra note 37, at 432-33. Smoking rates also have independent normative
validity because many people find smoking to be distasteful, but the health effects of tobacco use
are the primary motivation for anti-smoking campaigns.
41 Id.
42 See Fleming & Demets, supra note 37, at 607-08 (discussing how several heart medications, which were approved by the FDA on the basis of their impact on surrogate measures, were
subsequently found to increase mortality in clinical trials).
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policy merely on the basis of its tendency to affect prices or output levels.
Unlike in medicine, there typically are not measureable phenomena that can
be used as surrogates for economic wellbeing. To assess the desirability of
outcomes, economists have formulated concepts such as consumer and
producer surplus, which represent the gains from trade in a market.43
Note that surplus is a purely abstract concept, with no analog in the natural world. It is defined by reference to supply and demand curves, which
represent the quantities producers would supply and consumers would
demand at various counterfactual prices. Surplus, supply curves, and
demand curves cannot be physically measured, but rather must be estimated
by combining data on prices and output levels at different points in time
with theoretical assumptions about consumer and producer behavior.
Because the framework for relating observable data to surplus is so well
established,44 economists do not need to revisit its fundamentals every time
they evaluate a proposed policy. Indeed, it can be easy to overlook the
assumptions underlying any calculation of surplus.45 Nevertheless, the
concept of surplus allows economists to organize data on prices and output
levels into a measure of economic wellbeing that can assess the impact of
various policies and provide justification for proposed reforms.
D. Empirical Legal Scholarship
In contrast to medicine and economics, legal scholarship lacks frameworks for connecting empirical findings to normative claims. Occasionally,
when legal changes can be assessed in terms of outcomes that have direct
normative significance, there is no need for sophisticated theory. For
example, in studies that examine the impact of tort reforms on medical

43 Economists often use more sophisticated measures of wellbeing as well, in part because
measures of surplus do not account for distributional impact. For simplicity, I focus on surplus in
the current discussion.
44 The concepts of consumer and producer surplus were popularized by the economist Alfred Marshall in 1890. See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 175 (1890)
(defining consumer surplus); id. at 428 (defining producer surplus).
45 See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE ECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 251-52 (7th
ed. 2006) (showing that the definition of consumer surplus depends upon the assumption that
consumers have quasilinear utility functions); Charles F. Manski, Monotone Treatment Response, 65
ECONOMETRICA 1311, 1315-16 (1997) (noting that supply and demand functions are often assumed
to be linear as a matter of convenience and that this assumption is not motivated by economic
theory).
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complications in childbirth46 or the effect of school desegregation decisions
on black dropout rates,47 the normative significance of the outcomes is clear.
At other times, frameworks from other disciplines are sufficient to evaluate outcomes. For example, studies that evaluate the impact of school
finance decisions on academic achievement may use test scores as outcome
variables.48 Similarly, studies may use economic concepts to appraise the
welfare impacts of proposed mergers.49
The methods of the other disciplines are most likely to be adequate
when the outcomes of interest are similar to those that arise in the other
disciplines. If one views law purely as a means to achieve policy goals, then
the methods of the social sciences can often be used with little adaptation.
Studies such as those discussed above only need to comprehend law well
enough to understand the timing and expected impact of legal changes.
Such studies, however, are conducted from an external point of view; one
does not need to take any position on the validity of legal events in order to
appraise them from a policy perspective.50
Some empirical legal research, however, appears to be motivated by values internal to law. Although these values are rarely made explicit, such
studies appear to be animated by concerns about deciding cases correctly,
treating likes alike, or writing good judicial opinions. Such concepts are not

46 See Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, First Do No Harm? Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes, 123 Q.J. ECON. 795, 801-04 (2008) (measuring the effects of joint-and-several liability and
damage caps on childbirth complications).
47 See Jonathan Guryan, Desegregation and Black Dropout Rates, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 919
(2004).
48 See, e.g., William J. Glenn, School Finance Adequacy Litigation and Student Achievement: A
Longitudinal Analysis, 34 J. EDUC. FIN. 247, 249 (2009) (“Generally, measuring student outcomes
entails using test scores.”); Thomas A. Downes, Evaluating the Impact of School Finance Reform on
the Provision of Public Education: The California Case, 45 NAT’L TAX J. 405, 414 (1992) (“There is
little evidence that outcomes, as measured by test scores, were less unequal after the school finance
reforms of the late 1970’s.”).
49 See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Empirical Methods in Merger Analysis: Econometric Analysis of Pricing in FTC v. Staples, 13 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 265, 270-72 (2006) (discussing alternative
approaches to measuring lost consumer surplus due to a proposed merger).
50 This is not to deny that these studies are important to policymakers or to legal scholars.
Such research is clearly relevant to legislators and administrators, and many contemporary judges
and scholars accept that judges do and should consider the policy consequences of their decisions.
See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 18 (2006) (arguing that “judges, in applying a text in light of its purpose, should look to
consequences, including ‘contemporary conditions, social, industrial, and political, of the community
to be affected’”); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98-141
(1921) (arguing that it is sometimes appropriate for judges to act like legislators); RICHARD A.
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 78-91 (2009) (describing judges as “occasional legislators”).
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directly measurable, however, and the methods of the social sciences are
often inadequate for connecting measureable outcomes to these concepts.
Developing methods for evaluating the effects of legal rules and institutions according to criteria internal to law ought to be a priority for legal
empiricists. Influential theorists such as Ronald Dworkin,51 Joseph Raz,52
and John Rawls53 have argued that institutions should be evaluated by their
tendency to protect rights and promote justice.54 Many debates about
interpretive methods focus on their tendency to promote accurate interpretation, substantive justice, and the rule of law.55 And the Supreme Court’s
administrative due process jurisprudence evaluates procedures according to
their “capacity for accurate factfinding and appropriate application of
substantive legal norms to the facts as found.”56
The fundamental challenge is that such internal values cannot be directly measured. Instead of developing theories that can relate observable data
to these values, as scholars have done in medical research and in economics,
empirical studies in law often substitute proxy variables that have some
asserted but unspecified connection to the motivating values. Parts II–IV
examine three such measures—citation counts, reversal rates, and interjudge

51 See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 34 (1999) (“I see no alternative but to use a result-driven rather than a procedure-driven standard for deciding [institutional questions]. The best institutional structure is the
one best calculated to produce the best answers to the essentially moral question of what the
democratic conditions actually are, and to secure stable compliance with those conditions.”).
52 See Joseph Raz, Disagreement in Politics, 43 AM. J. JURIS. 25, 45 (1998) (“A natural way to
proceed is to assume that the enforcement of fundamental rights should be entrusted to whichever
political decision-procedure is, in the circumstances of the time and place, most likely to enforce
them well, with the fewest adverse side effects.”).
53 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 230 (1971) (“[T]he fundamental criterion for
judging any procedure is the justice of its likely results.”).
54 Others, most notably Jeremy Waldron, reject the view that consequences are dispositive
for questions of institutional design. See WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 252-54 (2001)
(critiquing rights-instrumentalism).
55 See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 66-67 (2006) (advocating formalism on the ground that it
results in fewer errors); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory
Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 674-84 (1999) (arguing that canons of interpretation should
be appraised according to their tendency to promote democratic values, the rule of law, and other
substantive normative goals); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions,
101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 918 (2003) (arguing that formalism should be evaluated by its tendency to
avoid “mistakes and injustices”); Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 636, 656-57 (1999) (arguing that formalism should be evaluated according to its
tendency to avoid inaccuracy and uncertainty in judicial decisionmaking and to provide good ex
ante incentives).
56 Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L.
REV. 885, 895 (1981).
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disparities—that empirical scholars commonly use to evaluate judges and
legal institutions. Each of these outcome measures has an intuitive relevance to a normative goal, but the relationship is vague and undertheorized. Because scholars are rarely explicit about the relationship between these measures and the intended measure of merit—indeed, the
measure of merit is rarely defined—the empirical evidence cannot justify
the normative claims.
II. JUDICIAL CITATION COUNTS
In a series of recent articles, Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, and various
coauthors have advocated the use of quantifiable metrics to address normative questions about judicial appointment, promotion, retention, and
compensation. They have argued that nominations to the Supreme Court
should be determined on the basis of three empirical indicators: citation
counts, the number of opinions authored, and the rate at which judges
disagree with colleagues of the same political party.57 Using these measures
in a series of studies, they found evidence that “female judges . . . perform
better than male judges”58 and that “elected judges are superior to appointed
judges.”59 The authors also used these same performance measures to
estimate the effects of judicial compensation, finding that “it is as likely that
judges are overpaid as that they are underpaid.”60
These authors were not the first to apply a quantitative analysis to the
study of judicial citations. As early as 1936, one study tabulated the number
of citations to each state’s courts from other state courts and the U.S.
Supreme Court.61 The goals of the early citation studies, however, were
purely descriptive. Scholars typically characterized citation counts as a
measure of influence but did not use them to justify prescriptive claims. At
times, these measures were given normative interpretations; for example,
Judge Richard Posner claimed that Learned Hand’s citation counts confirmed that he “was indeed a great judge.”62 But until recently, no one
argued that these measures should guide judicial appointments or the design
of legal institutions.
57 Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 21, at 305-13; Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking,
supra note 21, at 50-67.
58 Choi et al., supra note 24, at 505 (emphasis added).
59 Choi et al., supra note 22, at 292 (emphasis added).
60 Choi et al., supra note 23, at 63 (emphasis added).
61 See Rodney L. Mott, Judicial Influence, 30 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 295, 308 tbl.VI, 311 tbl.VII
(1936).
62 Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial Greatness, 104
YALE L.J. 511, 540 (1994) (book review).
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Before we cut judges’ pay and jettison judicial independence, however,
we should scrutinize how the authors derived their normative claims from
their empirical findings. They do not claim that citations themselves are a
measure of goodness; in fact, they acknowledge that their measures “do not
provide a perfect metric for judging skill”63 and are merely “rough proxies.”64 Thus, the fact that Judge A has more citations than Judge B does not
directly justify an assertion that that Judge A is better than Judge B.
But once they acknowledge that citations do not actually measure quality, how can they use aggregate comparisons between groups of judges to
justify claims about the relative quality of elected judges versus appointed
judges, or male judges versus female judges? Citation counts could arguably
be viewed as surrogates65 for some “true” measure of judicial quality, but if
so, their use as surrogates must be validated. Choi and Gulati justify the
validity of citation counts largely on theoretical grounds, analogizing the
body of precedent to a “market” for judicial opinions.66 Because the “price”
of citing opinions is zero, judges will compete on quality. As they put it,
“[a]ll judges will cite the best opinions,”67 and therefore, the best judges will
garner the most citations.
Many critics, however, have questioned how well citation counts actually correlate with merit.68 In addition, there are plausible arguments that
citation measures may be correlated with judicial “vices.”69 One claim is
that citation counts reward originality, so these measures will reward judges
who change the law rather than follow it.70 Another argument is that
unclear opinions may create uncertainty and generate more litigation, thus

Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 21, at 29.
Id. at 34.
65 See supra Section I.B.
66 Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 21, at 306.
67 Id. at 307.
68 See, e.g., Jay S. Bybee & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Tournament, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1055, 1058 (2005) (“[W]e question whether the metrics proposed by Professors Choi and Gulati
appropriately measure the performance of circuit judges.”); Marin K. Levy et al, The Costs of
Judging Judges by the Numbers, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 313, 314 (2010) (“We believe that there is
now a general consensus that (1) the judicial virtues the legal empiricists set out to measure
probably have little bearing on what actually makes for a good judge; and (2) even if they did, the
empiricists’ chosen variables have not measured those virtues accurately.”); Lawrence B. Solum, A
Tournament of Virtue, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1365, 1389 (2005) (characterizing the argument “that
citation rate correlates with judicial excellence” as “somewhat obscure”); WERL, On Tournaments
for Appointing Great Justices to the U.S. Supreme Court, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 157, 171 (2004) (describing
a “considerable gap . . . between what the numbers purport to measure and what they actually
measure”); see also infra notes 85-110 and accompanying text.
69 Solum, supra note 68, at 1389.
70 See id. at 1392-93.
63

64
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generating more citations.71 Finally, “an opinion notorious for being ‘wrong’
might also lead to many cites.”72
Because citation counts might be associated with judicial vices as well as
judicial virtues, theory alone cannot validate the use of citation counts as a
surrogate for quality. Determining which judicial characteristics constitute
virtue and vice is a matter of normative theory. But for any conception of
judicial quality, determining whether citations are more strongly associated
with virtue or vice is an empirical question. Of course, this is impossible to
test without first specifying a normative benchmark.73
Many studies simply assume the validity of citation counts as a surrogate for quality, acknowledging that citations could be correlated with
judicial vice, but dismissing this possibility as unlikely.74 A mere positive
correlation, however, is not sufficient to validate citations as a surrogate for
quality.75 Scholars who seek to use citation measures to inform policy
decisions must be able to convey uncertainty about their assessments of
judicial merit. This cannot be done without a nuanced understanding of the
relationship between citations and the conception of merit that is employed.
Choi and Gulati also defend the proposed use of citation counts in the
selection of Supreme Court justices on the ground that “objective factors
will do better than what we have now: a biased and nontransparent process
overwhelmed by politics.”76 The use of objective measures, however, cannot
displace normative debates about judicial merit. Citation counts cannot be
validated as a surrogate without first articulating a conception of merit.
In addition, there are many objective measures that could potentially be
used to evaluate judges. How could one choose among them without some
71 See Frank B. Cross & James F. Spriggs II, The Most Important (and Best) Supreme Court
Opinions and Justices, 60 EMORY L.J. 407, 421 (2010) (“The first and most common criticism of
citation usage is that it fails to capture dispositive rulings that conclusively resolve legal issues.”);
Montgomery N. Kosma, Measuring the Influence of Supreme Court Justices, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 333,
339 (1998) (noting that unclear precedents may generate more litigation than clear precedents,
resulting in more citations).
72 Robert Henry, Do Judges Think? Comments on Several Papers Presented at the Duke Law
Journal's Conference on Measuring Judges and Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1703, 1717 (2009); see also Frank B.
Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383, 1391 n.25 (2009) (“[S]ome
citations may be attributable to ‘outrageously’ bad decisions.”).
73 See Solum, supra note 68, at 1368 (arguing that it is necessary to answer the normative
question of what makes for excellence in judging before formally measuring judicial performance).
74 See, e.g., Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 21, at 70 (acknowledging but dismissing the concern that rewarding judges for citations might induce them to write “longer and
more complex opinions that provide more citations”); Cross & Spriggs, supra note 71, at 421
(“While the ‘settled case’ phenomenon is theoretically problematic for any citation measure, its
existence is questionable.”).
75 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
76 Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 21, at 304.
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normative baseline for comparison? To illustrate, compare the citation
measures proposed by Choi and Gulati with alternative measures proposed
by Robert Anderson.77 Whereas Choi and Gulati do not distinguish among
positive, negative, and neutral citations in their measures, Anderson
interprets negative citations as evidence of low quality and ignores neutral
citations. Choi and Gulati count only citations from outside a judge’s
circuit, whereas Anderson counts citations from both inside and outside a
judge’s circuit. Finally, Choi and Gulati count citations to all opinions
authored by a judge, while Anderson counts citations to all decisions in
which the judge was on the panel.
Not surprisingly, these two methodologies yield very different rankings.78 Even if both of these measures could potentially be useful for
measuring judicial performance, how could one know which measure to use?
Is the difference between the two measures primarily methodological, in the
sense that one method might be a better surrogate for a common conception
of judicial quality? Or is the difference primarily normative, in the sense
that the measures serve as surrogates for competing conceptions of judicial
merit?
Anderson characterizes the differences between the measures as both
methodological and normative. He justifies the exclusion of negative
citations on normative grounds, arguing that negative citations may be
appropriate for measuring influence, but that only positive citations are
appropriate for measuring quality.79 Similarly, he justifies examining panel
membership rather than opinion authorship on the grounds that it “capture[s] collegial factors that should enter into a measure of good judging.”80
But he also claims that part of the difference is methodological, arguing that
using panel membership is appropriate because it “mitigate[s] the effects of
selection bias in opinion assignment.”81
To the extent that the difference between the two measures is methodological, one cannot assess which is a better surrogate without specifying a
conception of judicial merit. And to the extent the difference is normative,

77 See generally Robert Anderson IV, Distinguishing Judges: An Empirical Ranking of Judicial
Quality in the United States Courts of Appeals, 76 MO. L. REV. 315 (2011) (proposing a method of
ranking judges that distinguishes between positive and negative citations).
78 See id. at 349 (“The results of this analysis differ dramatically from those of prior judge
ranking studies.”).
79 Id. at 325-26; see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics
on Law: A Quantitative Study, 36 J.L. & ECON. 385, 389-90 (1993) (“When speaking of influence
rather than quality, one has no call to denigrate critical citations.”).
80 Anderson, supra note 77, at 329 (emphasis added).
81 Id.
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the use of objective and quantifiable measures cannot displace normative
debates about judicial merit. Either way, one cannot choose between these
two measures without taking a position in the normative debate that the
citation studies are purporting to circumvent.
Nevertheless, citation counts could conceivably be validated subjectively.
Even though conceptions of judicial quality are inherently subjective,
objective data could still be used to inform those subjective judgments.
Scholars, for example, could survey informed observers about their perceptions of judges’ relative competence or the quality of particular opinions.
On certain dimensions of judicial quality, there is likely to be strong
agreement. To take some extreme examples, everyone would agree that
Chief Justice John Marshall was a greater judge than his contemporary
Gabriel Duvall,82 or that Learned Hand83 was superior to his colleague
Martin Manton, who went to prison for accepting bribes.84 On other
dimensions, however, assessments of judicial quality are likely to be disputed. For example, a comparison of Justices Sotomayor and Alito will likely
depend on one’s ideological leanings.
Such surveys could reveal the degree to which conceptions of judicial
merit are shared and the degree to which they are disputed. The grounds
for disagreement could potentially be approximated by a small number of
salient dimensions, such as liberalism versus conservatism or pragmatism
versus formalism. Empirical studies of citations can never tell us what kind
of judge we ought to prefer, but they might conceivably shed light on how
judges measure along these dimensions of judicial merit. To the extent that
there are commonly shared conceptions of quality, these objective measures
might at least be able to distinguish good judges on each side of the ideological spectrum from mediocre ones. Of course, survey responses do not
indicate merit in an objective sense, but at least they would correspond to
the conceptions of merit that are prevalent in scholarly dialogue or democratic deliberation.

82 See David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 466, 466 (1983) (“Duvall’s performance reveals . . . that he achieved an enviable standard
of insignificance.”).
83 Hand is widely recognized as one of the greatest judges in American history. See GERALD
GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE xv (2d ed. 2011) (“Learned Hand is
numbered among a small group of truly great American Judges of the twentieth Century.”);
Posner, supra note 62, at 511 (describing Hand as the “third-greatest judge in the history of the
United States, after Holmes and John Marshall”).
84 See generally JOSEPH BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE 25-93 (1962) (describing Judge
Manton’s corruption); Allan D. Vestal, A Study in Perfidy, 35 IND. L.J. 17 (1959) (same).
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It is essential, however, that citation measures be validated as surrogates
for some discoverable measure of quality. In theory, it may seem plausible
that good judges would be more productive and write better opinions, and
that better opinions would generate more citations. But judicial craft is only
one factor—and possibly a minor one—in determining how often a case is
cited. Even a cursory examination can show that citation counts do not
correspond very well to commonly held perceptions of judicial merit.
Consider two canonical torts cases—Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.85
and United States v. Carroll Towing Co.86—which are taught in virtually
every first-year law school torts class. Judge Cardozo’s opinion in Palsgraf,
which has been described as “[p]erhaps the most celebrated of all tort
cases,”87 has been cited 218 times in published opinions in federal and state
courts.88 Judge Hand’s opinion in Carroll Towing, which formulated the
“Learned Hand rule” for negligence liability and has been described as one
of the “two most influential opinions that Hand ever wrote,”89 has been
cited a total of 177 times.90 By comparison, the opinion in Bonner v. City of
Prichard,91 which holds that all Fifth Circuit decisions handed down prior to
October 1, 1981 are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, has been
cited 4311 times.92
Similarly, Marbury v. Madison93 has been cited 252 times in Supreme
Court opinions, barely more than once per term.94 McCulloch v. Maryland95
has been cited 326 times in Supreme Court opinions,96 less than twice per
term. But United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,97 which held that
the syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court, has been cited 4362
times in the U.S. Reports.98

162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
87 William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1953).
88 Westlaw search for “162 N.E. 99” in SCT, CTAR, DCTR, and ALLSTATES databases
through December 31, 2011.
89 Posner, supra note 62, at 513.
90 Westlaw search for “159 F.2d 169” in SCT, CTAR, DCTR, and ALLSTATES databases
through December 31, 2011.
91 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981).
92 Westlaw search for “661 F.2d 1206” in SCT, CTAR, DCTR, and ALLSTATES databases
through December 31, 2011.
93 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
94 Westlaw search for “5 U.S. 137” in SCT database through December 31, 2011.
95 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
96 Westlaw search for “4 Wheat 316” in SCT database through December 31, 2011.
97 200 U.S. 321, 337 (1906).
98 Westlaw search for “200 U.S. 321” in SCT database through December 31, 2011.
85

86
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These examples illustrate that frequency of citation does not necessarily
correspond to commonly held perceptions of the importance of a holding or
the quality of the written opinion. A more detailed comparison of Supreme
Court decisions confirms this same pattern. Figure 1 compares a selection of
Supreme Court decisions, displaying how often each case was cited per year
in reported federal cases.99 Canonical constitutional cases are dwarfed by
holdings on frequently litigated issues such as standards for summary
judgment and pleading requirements. Brown v. Board of Education100 is cited
29 times per year, whereas Anderson v. Liberty Lobby101 and Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett102—two decisions providing standards for summary judgment—are
each cited more than 1600 times per year. Since it was decided in 1986,
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby has been cited almost 45,000 times, roughly as
many times as every case decided by the Marshall Court combined.103

Figure 1: Federal Citations per Year for Selected
Supreme Court Decisions

Westlaw search of SCT, CTAR, and DCTR databases through December 31, 2011.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
101 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
102 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
103 A sample of pages in Shepard’s spanning the Marshall Court yielded an estimate of
roughly 45,000 federal citations.
99

100
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Although judicial merit may well influence how often a judge’s opinions
are cited, these examples show that citation counts are strongly influenced
by factors unrelated to merit, such as how often an issue is presented in
litigation. Conceivably, such factors might be less relevant when comparing
citation counts at the level of individual judges. If each judge decides a mix
of high- and low-profile cases over time, then citation counts aggregated by
a judge might conceivably better correlate with commonly held perceptions
of merit. Such a claim is difficult to test, largely because judicial merit is
contested, and even subjective perceptions are difficult to quantify. But
citation statistics for Judge Learned Hand and his contemporaries on the
Second Circuit, as reported in an article by Judge Richard Posner,104 raise
serious questions about the validity of these measures, even when aggregated by judge. Using Posner’s results, I compiled statistics on opinions
authored and citations per year for judges who were active from 1925 until
1939, when Learned Hand and Martin Manton served together.105 The
statistics are based on published majority opinions, and the citation counts
only include citations by federal courts of appeals.
It may provide some reassurance that Learned Hand dominates his contemporaries, including Manton, in citations per year. But Manton has more
citations per year than highly respected judges such as Thomas Swan and
Augustus Hand.106 Moreover, in opinions per year—the measure of
“productivity” used by Choi and Gulati—Manton easily outpaces all of the
other Second Circuit judges, including Learned Hand.

See Posner, supra note 62.
All analysis is based on Posner’s published results, and not an independent analysis of the
original data, which are no longer available.
106 See, e.g., GUNTHER, supra note 83, at 242 (stating that once the “Learned Hand-Augustus
Hand-Thomas Swan triumvirate was in place,” the Second Circuit “symbolized the highest
judicial quality in the nation”); MARVIN SCHICK, LEARNED HAND’S COURT 20-27 (1970)
(describing widespread respect for Swan and Augustus Hand). Swan had been the dean of Yale
Law School before joining the bench.
104
105
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Figure 2: Opinion Counts and Citations to Opinions Authored by Second Circuit Judges, 1925-39
Note: Only judges who were active for at least 5 years during 1925–39 are
included.

Manton’s deficiencies were not merely ethical; he was held in low esteem even before evidence of his corruption had surfaced. Learned Hand
had a poor opinion of Manton, perceiving him as “incapable of turning out
memoranda and opinions that could earn him the respect from the bar or
bench.”107 Chief Justice Taft believed that Manton “never should have been
appointed to the bench in the first place.”108 Other prominent contemporaries described him as “unfit for the bench”109 and “one of Wilson’s worst
appointments.”110 Yet in terms of two quantitative measures commonly used
to evaluate judges—“opinion quality” and “productivity”—Manton compares quite favorably to most of his Second Circuit contemporaries. If
sufficient weight were given to judicial “productivity,” Manton might even
rank above Learned Hand.
The fact that such quantitative measures cannot distinguish highly respected circuit judges from a judge widely regarded as one of the worst in
history raises serious questions about whether these measures are valid

107
108
109
110

GUNTHER, supra note 83, at 237.
DAVID J. DANELSKI, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE IS APPOINTED 45 (1964).
Id. at 51 (describing opinion of Attorney General Harry Daugherty).
Id. at 63 (quoting Elihu Root).
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surrogates for quality. Perhaps a more careful analysis of judicial citations
might yield useful information about some conceptions of judicial merit.
The analysis here, for example, did not distinguish between positive and
negative citations, or between in-circuit and out-of-circuit citations. It may
also be possible to control for outlier opinions that are highly cited, such as
those involving summary judgment. Various statistical adjustments could
potentially lead to more refined citation measures that more accurately
reflect some conception of judicial merit. The multiplicity of possible
adjustments, however, presents a choice of which to apply, which requires
some external conception of merit against which the various adjustments
can be compared.
III. REVERSAL RATES
Reversal rates are a commonly used outcome measure in empirical studies of judicial decisionmaking and are widely used to justify normative
claims about judges and courts. In the last decade, more than 1000 law
review articles included some mention of reversal or affirmance rates,
although many uses were purely descriptive.111 Like citation counts, reversal
statistics are easy to calculate but can be difficult to interpret.
Many scholars have advocated using reversal rates as indicators of judicial quality,112 and some state courts use reversal rates in judicial performance evaluations.113 Reversal rates are also commonly used to evaluate
circuits, with one study even assigning letter grades to the various circuits
based on how often they are reversed by the Supreme Court.114 In debates
about splitting the Ninth Circuit, scholars and judges have often discussed
the Ninth Circuit’s high reversal rate and debated its normative significance.115
111 Westlaw search for “reversal rate” or “affirmance rate” in JLR database from Jan. 1, 2002
until December 31, 2011.
112 See Cross & Lindquist, supra note 72, at 1402-05 (defending reversal rates as performance
indicators for circuit judges); Floyd Feeney, Evaluating Trial Court Performance, 12 JUST. SYS. J.
148, 151-53 (1987) (describing reversal rates as an accepted indicator of trial court performance);
Rebecca D. Gill et al., Are Judicial Performance Evaluations Fair to Women and Minorities? A
Cautionary Tale from Clark County, Nevada, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 731, 751 (2011) (characterizing
reversal rates as being “among the most relevant and quantifiable objective measures we have” of
judicial performance).
113 See David C. Brody, Judicial Performance Evaluations by State Governments: Informing the
Public While Avoiding the Pitfalls, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 333, 340 (2000) (describing use of reversal rates
by the Alaska Judicial Council).
114 Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the Federal Courts of Appeals,
LANDSLIDE, Jan.-Feb. 2010, at 10.
115 See Jerome Farris, The Ninth Circuit—Most Maligned Circuit in the Country—Fact or Fiction?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1465, 1465-70 (1997) (minimizing the significance of the Ninth Circuit’s
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Judges themselves have considered reversal rates in trial courts and administrative proceedings in determining whether procedures were adequate
under the due process clause.116 A growing literature in patent law has
examined how often the Federal Circuit reverses claim construction decisions by district judges and debated the implications of the reversal rate.117
One recent study evaluated economic training programs for district
reversal rate because most cases are not reviewed by the Supreme Court and many reversals
occurred in cases in which “reasonable minds can differ”); Arthur D. Hellman, Getting It Right:
Panel Error and the En Banc Process in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 425,
432 (2000) (describing a circuit’s “disproportionately high reversal rate” in the Supreme Court as a
“matter of concern”); Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth
Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405, 489 (1998) (denying that the Ninth Circuit’s “high
reversal rate is a problem that needs to be solved by a circuit split” because it is attributable to
“ideological disagreement”); Richard A. Posner, Is the Ninth Circuit Too Large? A Statistical Study of
Judicial Quality, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 711, 712-13 (2000) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s reversal
rate is a “meaningless” statistic because reversals “often involve disagreement rather than the
correction of error,” but claiming that rates of summary reversal have normative significance);
Kevin M. Scott, Supreme Court Reversals of the Ninth Circuit, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 341, 342 (2006)
(describing the Ninth Circuit’s reversal rate as “cause for concern”).
116 See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 756 n.1 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
reversal rate of criminal convictions on mandatory appeals in the state courts, while not overwhelming, is certainly high enough to suggest that depriving defendants of their right to appeal
would expose them to an unacceptable risk of erroneous conviction.”); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 346-47 (1976) (viewing reversal rates as “relevant” but “not controlling” in assessing the
adequacy of administrative procedures, especially when new evidence can be presented on appeal);
Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845, 885 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 678 F.3d 1013
(9th Cir. 2012) (holding that Department of Veterans Affairs policy for adjudicating claims for
mental health benefits “has not worked, given the high reversal rates of those determinations”).
117 See, e.g., Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1143 (2001) ( f inding that the Federal Circuit has reversed
fewer cases overall, but has increased its claim construction modification and claim interpretationbased reversal rates); Richard S. Gruner, How High is Too High?: Reflections on the Sources and
Meaning of Claim Construction Reversal Rates at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 981, 1071
(2010) (arguing that concerns about claim construction reversal rates are misplaced because most
appeals involve hard cases); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent
Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2-3 (2001) (arguing that the claim construction reversal rate is
“problematic” because “it raises concerns about the efficiency of [the] adjudication system” and
“creates doubt about the abilities of district court judges to adjudicate complex technical patent
cases”); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 245-47 (2005) ( f inding an increase in claim construction reversal
rates and concluding that “[t]he fault . . . undoubtedly lies with the Federal Circuit” because it
“is not providing sufficient guidance on claim construction”); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes
Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV.
223, 245-57 (2008) (examining whether claim construction reversal rates improve as a function of
judicial experience); David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073,
1091-107 (2010) (examining the impact of Markman v. Westview Instruments on reversal rates, but
urging caution in interpreting the results); Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)certainty at the Federal
Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1171-84 (2010) (arguing that reversal rates in claim construction
cases are problematic).
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court judges by measuring how often their decisions in antitrust cases were
appealed and reversed.118
Reversal rates have been prominently featured in debates about reforming asylum adjudication. In 2002, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft
adopted “streamlining” rules for the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),
which permitted decisions by immigration judges to be affirmed by a single
BIA member in an unsigned opinion.119 The rate at which the BIA reversed
immigration judge decisions plummeted, leading some commentators to
criticize the streamlining reforms for allowing errors to go uncorrected.120
Ashcroft contended that these reversal rates had no significance121 but then
went on to claim that “the BIA streamlining reforms were a profound
success” because fewer than ten percent of BIA decisions were reversed by
circuit courts.122 Yet in a widely noted opinion, Judge Richard Posner cited
the BIA’s reversal rate in the Seventh Circuit as evidence that immigration
adjudication had “fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.”123
Legal scholars seem to think that reversal rates are worth discussing, but
they rarely articulate why these rates are purportedly meaningful. Often,
reversal rates are conflated with error rates or imbued with unwarranted
normativity. One study, for example, found that more than two-thirds of
death sentences in state courts are ultimately overturned on appeal.124 After
performing a highly sophisticated statistical analysis to examine what

118 See Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals, 54 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-24
(2011) ( f inding that antitrust decisions by district judges and administrative law judges are more
likely to be appealed and reversed in complex cases, but less likely to be appealed and reversed
when the judge had participated in a program that provided basic economic training).
119 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2010). The streamlining regulations also required the Board to review
factual findings under the “clear error” standard, rather than de novo.
120 See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, PRACTICE AND PRO BONO RE: BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT 40-41
(2003) (“The federal courts are describing obvious errors committed by the BIA: errors that would
be comic, if they were not so tragic.”); ANNA O. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN THE
AMERICAN COURTS 150 (2010) (“Exacerbating the worry that individual Board member
adjudications would lead to more errors than a three-member panel was the increase in summary
affirmances of immigration judges’ decisions that went against the alien.”).
121 See John D. Ashcroft & Kris W. Kobach, A More Perfect System: The 2002 Reforms of the
Board of Immigration Appeals, 58 DUKE L.J. 1991, 2008 (2009) (agreeing with the Fourth Circuit’s
observation that reversal statistics are meaningless unless there is “an objectively correct percentage of reversals” to which an adjudicative body should aspire).
122 Id. at 2009.
123 Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 829, 830 (7th Cir. 2005).
124 See Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System: The Persistent Patterns of Reversals of Death
Sentences in the United States, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209, 214 (2004).
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factors predicted reversal, the authors considered policy options to reduce
reversal rates. First, they proposed rules requiring disclosure of exculpatory
evidence and more funding for defense lawyers at the trial stage.125 But then
they noted that reversal rates could also be reduced by limiting the grounds
for reversal and withdrawing funding for attorneys who represent deathrow inmates at the post-conviction stage.126 The authors did not actually
advocate the latter proposals, acknowledging that “[t]he positive impact of
such policies is questionable.”127 The fact that they simultaneously considered increasing funding for trial lawyers and defunding appellate lawyers,
however, suggests that they were asking the wrong question. By conflating
reversals with errors,128 the authors lost sight of their normative goals.
Defunding appellate lawyers may well reduce reversals, but this should
serve as a reminder that the reduction of reversal rates is not a worthy end
in itself.
As with citation counts, reversal rates do not have any intrinsic normative significance; they are only useful insofar as they can shed light on other
normatively significant quantities, such as error rates. A reversal is a good
outcome when the lower court was wrong, but it is a bad outcome when the
lower court was correct. If the applicable law is indeterminate, a reversal
reflects the fact that the higher and the lower courts are exercising discretion differently. Reversal rates, however, aggregate “good reversals” and
“bad reversals,” as well as “ambiguous reversals” when the law is indeterminate.
Although reversal rates are commonly used to measure error rates of
lower courts, they accurately reflect error only when four conditions are
satisfied: the law is always determinate, both courts are addressing the same
legal question and relying on the same sources of law, all cases are appealed,
and the higher court is always correct. Scholars can debate whether and
when the first two conditions hold,129 but the third is rarely satisfied and the
fourth is almost always implausible. Thus, additional assumptions are
necessary to draw normative conclusions from reversal rates.

Id. at 255.
Id. at 256.
127 Id. at 257.
128 See id. at 216-17 (defining the “total error rate” in terms of probabilities of reversal); id. at
218 (“We counted only error that actually resulted in reversal by the highest court with authority to
review the verdict at the relevant stage of review.” (emphasis added)).
129 Ronald Dworkin, most prominently, has adhered to the view that the law is determinate
even in hard cases. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1977). But this
viewpoint, while influential, is not widely held. Whether courts are addressing the same legal
question will necessarily depend upon context.
125

126
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The proportion of cases that are appealed is especially relevant when the
reviewing court is the U.S. Supreme Court, which hears only a tiny fraction
of petitioned cases. For example, Judge Jerome Farris observed that the
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in 28 out of 29 cases it reviewed
in 1997.130 Yet he defended the Ninth Circuit by arguing that the Court let
stand more than 99% of all Ninth Circuit decisions from the previous
year.131
A further complication is that reviewing courts do not necessarily consider the same legal issues as lower courts. When lower court decisions are
reviewed under a deferential standard, a reversal might be stronger evidence
of error, or at least strong disagreement. Failure to reverse, however, does
not show that the higher court believed that the lower court judgment was
correct.
In addition, higher courts and lower courts are often bound by different
sources of law, even when resolving the same dispute. A circuit court panel
may reach a result that is compelled by circuit precedent, but the Supreme
Court would not be bound by the same circuit precedent. The Supreme
Court also has the authority to overrule its own precedent, whereas a circuit
court is obligated to follow such precedent until it is overruled by the
Supreme Court.132 Thus, reversal by the Supreme Court may well represent
the application of different legal principles rather than disagreement about
the same legal principles. In other words, the Supreme Court can overrule a
circuit court, and both can still be correct.
Consider Judge Richard Posner’s opinion in Khan v. State Oil Co.,133 an
antitrust case involving maximum resale price maintenance. Judge Posner
believed the outcome was controlled by the Supreme Court’s holding in
Albrecht v. Herald Co.134 Posner criticized Albrecht at length, describing it as
“unsound when decided, and . . . inconsistent with later decisions by the
Supreme Court.”135 He continued: “It should be overruled. Someday, we
expect, it will be.”136 In a not-so-subtle signal to the Supreme Court, Posner

See Farris, supra note 115, at 1465.
See id.
132 See Rodrigues de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“[T]he
Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”).
133 93 F.3d 1358 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
134 390 U.S. 145 (1968), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
135 Khan, 93 F.3d at 1363.
136 Id.
130
131
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wrote, “Yet despite all its infirmities, its increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten
foundations, Albrecht has not been expressly overruled.”137
Presumably, Judge Posner was not disappointed when the Supreme
Court reversed him unanimously and overruled Albrecht,138 relying extensively on his reasoning in the Seventh Circuit decision.139 In this example, it
would certainly be reasonable to assert that the Supreme Court was correct
to overrule Albrecht, but that Posner was also correct to follow Albrecht
despite his disagreement with its holding. From this point of view, the
reversal does not reflect poorly on Posner; it resulted from the fact that the
Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court were bound by different sources of
law. To the contrary, this reversal demonstrates Posner’s influence, since he
was able to convince the Court to hear the case and overrule a longstanding
precedent that he disfavored.
To support any kind of conclusion about error rates, reversal rates must
be interpreted in conjunction with some kind of assumptions about the
relative competence of higher and lower courts and the determinacy of the
law in the cases being analyzed.140 In debates about the performance of the
Ninth Circuit, for example, Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain has cited the
Ninth Circuit’s high reversal rate in the Supreme Court as evidence that the
Ninth Circuit “got it wrong” in a large majority of the cases that were
reviewed.141 Arthur Hellman has argued that, irrespective of whether the
ultimate outcome is correct, “it is not healthy when an intermediate court is
reversed repeatedly by the highest court in the structure.”142 But others
have argued that the reversal rate reflects positively on the Ninth Circuit.
According to Michelle Landis Dauber, the problem was “not that the 9th
Circuit [was] getting the law wrong” but rather that “the Rehnquist Court
[was] changing the law.”143 Judge Stephen Reinhardt, the most frequently
reversed circuit judge in the federal courts,144 is said to view his reversal rate
as a “mark of distinction.”145 Judge Richard Posner, on the other hand,
Id. (internal citation omitted).
See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
139 See id. at 15-16, 20.
140 A high degree of disagreement between higher and lower courts may still provide evidence of substantial confusion about the meaning of the law and inefficiency in the resolution of
disputes. See sources cited supra note 117 (discussing high reversal rates in patent cases).
141 Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, A Decade of Reversal: The Ninth Circuit’s Record in the Supreme
Court Since October Term 2000, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2010).
142 Hellman, supra note 115.
143 Michele Landis Dauber, The 9th Circuit Follows, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 19, 2002, at 37.
144 See Cross & Lindquist, supra note 72, at 1407 tbl.1 (ranking circuit court judges by frequency of reversal).
145 Heather K. Gerken, Judge Stories, 120 YALE L.J. 529, 530 (2010).
137

138
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argues that reversal rates are meaningless statistics because “reversals by the
Supreme Court often involve disagreement rather than the correction of
error, and . . . the Supreme Court has neither the capacity nor the incentive to review more than a tiny percentage of federal courts of appeals
decisions.”146
The above commentators agree about what the Ninth Circuit’s reversal
rate is, but they have sharply differing views about its normative implications. Reversal rates may be objective, but they must be interpreted in
conjunction with contestable assumptions about the relative competence of
higher and lower courts, the institutional obligations of the lower courts,
and the determinacy of the law in the cases under examination. Judge
O’Scannlain’s conclusions appear to be posited on a belief that the Supreme
Court is usually correct when it disagrees with the Ninth Circuit; Judge
Reinhardt’s and Dauber’s viewpoints are premised upon a more negative
view of the Supreme Court. Hellman’s position is predicated on a view that
inferior courts should try to predict how the Supreme Court will rule, but
Dauber disagrees, arguing that “the job of an intermediate court does not
entail . . . trying to divine what the current members of the Supreme
Court might do if and when they get the case.”147 Posner’s view, on the
other hand, reflects his view of the Court as a “political body”148 rather than
as a tribunal resolving legally determinate disputes.
As these conflicting interpretations demonstrate, scholars must be explicit about the premises that underlie their normative conclusions. These
premises, moreover, must be plausible. Simple but implausible assumptions
such as “the higher court is always correct” may support straightforward
interpretations of reversal rates, but such conclusions have little value.
What is needed are methods for combining objective data on reversals with
plausible assumptions to generate useful conclusions that can inform
policymaking.
A study of jury verdicts by Bruce Spencer provides an instructive example. Spencer examined disagreement between juries and judges in trial

146 Posner, supra note 115, at 712. Posner, however, argues that rates of summary reversal
provide a useful indicator of circuit quality. See id. at 713.
147 Dauber, supra note 143, at 36. For sophisticated discussions about whether inferior courts
ought to predict how a higher court would rule, see Evan Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The
Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1994), which argues
that inferior courts may properly anticipate higher court rulings, and Michael C. Dorf, Prediction
and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 673 (1995), which argues that the prediction approach
is inconsistent with the rule of law.
148 See Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 34 (2005) (observing that, on most constitutional issues, the Supreme Court behaves like a political body).
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courts, but the same approach applies to disagreement between higher and
lower courts within the judicial hierarchy. Using data in which trial judges
had been surveyed about the correct outcome, Spencer estimated the
accuracy of jury verdicts under the assumption that the judge is at least as
likely to be correct as the jury.149 Of course, he could have considered
alternative assumptions as well. Stronger assumptions—such as that the
judge is twice as likely as the jury to be correct—would have yielded sharper
inferences. Similarly, weaker assumptions—such as that the judge is correct
at least 10% of the time—would have yielded weaker inferences. By interpreting the data according to a variety of assumptions, empirical scholars
can make their findings interpretable to an audience with a diverse range of
viewpoints.
IV. MEASURING THE RULE OF LAW: STUDIES
OF INTERJUDGE DISPARITY
A central feature of the rule of law is that the application of legal force is
governed by publicized rules rather than “the predilections of the individual
decisionmaker.”150 A large body of empirical research has sought to measure
the degree to which systems of adjudication deviate from this ideal. Such
studies have typically documented statistical disparities among judges—
differences in their rates of reaching various types of dispositions—and
concluded that the rule of law is violated. Such claims are typically followed
by calls for legal or institutional reform.
The earliest example of such a study may be an annual report published
by the criminal magistrates of New York City in 1914,151 which provided
detailed figures depicting the magistrates’ conviction rates for various
offenses. The magistrates reported large interjudge disparities in cases
involving public intoxication, vagrancy, disorderly conduct, and peddling
without a license, but more modest disparities in cases involving cruelty to
animals and violations of the motor vehicle laws.152

149 See Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 305, 310-14 (2007) (estimating the accuracy of jury verdicts from data on judge–jury
agreement).
150 RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 17 (2001).
151 See NEW YORK BOARD OF CITY MAGISTRATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CITY MAGISTRATES’ COURTS OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK ( F IRST DIVISION) FOR YEAR ENDING
DECEMBER 31, 1914 (1914) (compiling judicial outcomes with the intent of dissemination to the
general public).
152 See id. at 50-61 (providing numerical and graphical representations of magistrates’ decisions in various categories of cases).
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The magistrates were not trying to advance any grand theories about
law or adjudication; they merely hoped that publication of the statistics
would help the magistrates “recognize [their] own personal peculiarities”
and “correct any that cannot be justified in light of the records of [their]
associates.”153 But their reports provided inspiration to legal realists such as
Jerome Frank154 and to political scientists such as Charles Grove Haines,155
who viewed the results as confirmation that adjudication was inevitably
idiosyncratic.
Since the publication of the magistrates’ report in 1914, numerous studies have documented significant interjudge disparities in cases involving
criminal law,156 social security disability claims,157 and asylum adjudication.158 The original magistrates’ report had modest normative goals, but
many of these later studies advocated bold reforms. Disparity studies
provided much of the impetus for the enactment of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines159 and the disability grid for social security disability claims.160
More recently, scholars have been debating proposed reforms to address
disparities in asylum adjudication.161 Yet despite the large number of
disparity studies that have been conducted and the prominence of the policy
claims that have been advanced, there has been surprisingly little discussion
about how observable disparities relate to normatively significant concepts.
153

George Everson, The Human Element in Justice, 10 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 90, 98

(1919).
See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 124 (1930).
See Charles Grove Haines, General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political, and Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 177 ILL. L. REV. 96 (1922).
156 See, e.g., WAYNE L. MORSE & RONALD H. BEATTIE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OREGON 151-69 (1932); James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge
Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271 (1999);
Emil Frankel, The Offender and the Court: A Statistical Analysis of the Sentencing of Delinquents, 31
AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 448 (1940); Frederick J. Gaudet et al., Individual
Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges, 23 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811 (1933); Paul J.
Hofer et al., The Effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 99 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239 (1999); A. Abigail Payne, Does Inter-Judge Disparity Really Matter?
An Analysis of the Effects of Sentencing Reforms in Three Federal District Courts, 17 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 337 (1997); Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63
STAN. L. REV. 1 (2010); Whitney North Seymour, Jr., 1972 Sentencing Study for the Southern District
of New York, 45 N.Y. ST. B.J. 163 (1973); Joel Waldfogel, Does Inter-Judge Disparity Justify Empirically
Based Sentencing Guidelines?, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 293 (1998).
157 See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS: A STUDY
OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING SYSTEM 21 (1978).
158 See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 27.
159 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 25, at 104-142.
160 See generally MASHAW, supra note 26.
161 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to
Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2007); Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 27, at 378-89.
154
155
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A. The Normative Implications of Disparity
In the century since the magistrates released their annual report, the
methodology of disparity studies has barely changed. The studies count
judges’ decisions and report rates at which they reach various types of
outcomes. Whenever disparities are found, the authors conclude that some
reform is needed. Yet only a few of these studies have acknowledged that
these statistical disparities by themselves do not have intrinsic normative
significance. As one study of social security disability adjudication observed:
Two judges with different [rates of reversing disability determinations] are
probably behaving differently. But the reverse is not necessarily true: there
is no reason to exclude the possibility that two judges with 50 percent
[rates] are also behaving differently. Indeed, the likelihood is great that the
existing statistics mask an indeterminate additional amount of nonuniformity in the judge-to-judge handling of [social security] claims.162

Thus, although large disparities among judges are problematic, small
disparities do not necessarily indicate that a system of adjudication is
functioning well. If two social security judges were deciding cases using
coin flips, there would be no disparity, since both would reverse agency
determinations 50% of the time. This means that any existing disparities in
grant rates could be eliminated by ordering all judges to flip coins. The
absurdity of such a proposal demonstrates that eliminating statistical
disparity is not itself a worthy goal. Statistical disparity is only of interest
insofar as it can shed light on other values.
To understand the normative implications of these studies, it is necessary to articulate the values at stake and to explain how they relate to the
measureable statistics. Some of the prior scholarship has made efforts to
identify the relevant values, such as consistency, correctness, determinacy,
fairness, predictability, non-arbitrariness, and the rule of law.163 But there
has been little effort to explain how these values can be measured using
available data. In fact, the relationships between these values and measureable statistics can be quite complex.

MASHAW ET AL., supra note 157, at 22.
See id. at 13-27 (consistency and correctness); Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 27, at 299300 (predictability, fairness, and rule of law); Jeremy Waldron, Lucky in Your Judge, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 185, 190-92 (2007) (predictability, non-arbitrariness, and fairness).
162
163
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B. Consistency, Predictability, and Comparative Justice
Statistical disparities are of interest in part because they provide evidence of interjudge inconsistency—meaning that some cases would have been
decided differently if they had been assigned to different judges. Indeed,
many discussions of interjudge disparity focus on inconsistency as a normative concept.164 Inconsistency has normative significance for two distinct
reasons. The first is that it diminishes the predictability of adjudication.
The rule of law requires that people have notice regarding how the law will
be applied so that they can conform to its requirements and plan their
affairs accordingly.165 Notice will necessarily be inadequate to the extent
that the application of the law depends upon which judge is deciding each
case.166
Inconsistency among judges also implicates comparative justice.167 Some
legal rights may be comparative, in the sense that “a person’s due is determinable only by reference to his relations to other persons.”168 In the
sentencing context, for example, moral or legal principles may determine
that two offenders are equally culpable and should therefore receive the
same sentence, even if those principles do not uniquely determine what that
sentence should be. If two such offenders receive different sentences only
164 See, e.g., Rules for Adjudicating Disability Claims in Which Vocational Factors Must be
Considered, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,349, 55,351 (Nov. 28, 1978) ( j u stifying the grid rule for social
security disability determinations on the ground that it would “better assure consistency of
determinations”); MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 7
(1973) (criticizing the federal sentencing process for failing to provide “any semblance of the
consistency demanded by the ideal of equal justice”); Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 27, at 299
(“Americans don’t love consistent decisionmaking merely because we think that fairness to the
parties requires that similar cases should have similar outcomes. We also like the predictability
that stare decisis offers.”).
165 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39-40 (1964) (“Government says to the
citizen in effect, ‘These are the rules we expect you to follow. If you follow them, you have our
assurance that they are the rules that will be applied to your conduct.’”); Jules L. Coleman &
Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 582 (1993) (noting
that predictability provides agents with “the opportunity to conform their behavior to law’s
demands”); Waldron, supra note 163, at 191 (“An important element of most theories of the Rule
of Law is that those who make and administer state policy should do what they can to diminish its
unpredictability and provide a solid and reliable basis for calculation by ordinary citizens.”).
166 Consistency is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for predictability; even if all
judges would decide a case the same way, that outcome might not be predictable. However, one
might expect that a knowledgeable observer would be able to predict such an outcome with a
reasonable degree of accuracy. See Coleman & Leiter, supra note 165, at 584-85 (discussing how
“lawyers can and do predict, with a fairly high degree of accuracy, what outcomes judges will
reach” by relying on a “‘folk’ social scientific theory of adjudication”).
167 See Waldron, supra note 163, at 191-92 (discussing how inconsistent treatment of litigants
implicates comparative justice).
168 Joel Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, 83 PHIL. REV. 297, 298 (1974) (emphasis omitted).
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because they were sentenced by different judges, such a result would
constitute a violation of comparative justice.
Interjudge inconsistency, however, only captures one aspect of comparative justice. If two judges fail to treat like cases alike in precisely the same
way—perhaps by exhibiting the same degree of racial bias—then they could
be perfectly consistent with each other yet still violate comparative justice.
Nevertheless, inconsistency provides some evidence of comparative injustice when the cases under examination present common legal or factual
patterns.
Interjudge inconsistency appears to have an intuitive relationship with
observable data. If two social security judges are granting benefits to
claimants at very different rates, then they probably are treating the claimants inconsistently. Yet the relationship between measurable statistical
disparity and inconsistency is far more complex than the disparity studies
have acknowledged.169 The difference between the judges’ grant rates only
determines lower and upper bounds for inconsistency, but cannot identify
the precise level. Suppose, for example, that Judge A grants benefits to 30%
of claimants and Judge B grants benefits to 40% of claimants. If these two
judges saw a comparable mix of cases, then it follows that they would have
reached different results in at least 10% of the cases. There is no reason,
however, to presume that they would have disagreed exactly 10% of the
time. In fact, they could have disagreed as much as 70% of the time if they
would have granted benefits to entirely different sets of claimants.
Without more information, it is impossible to know whether the rate of
inconsistency between Judges A and B is closer to 10% or 70%. Measuring
inconsistency requires not only the judges’ grant rates, but also the degree
to which their decisions are correlated. There are no data that can provide
estimates of correlation, however, because the two judges are never observed deciding the same case. Conceivably, one could administer surveys
to Judge A and Judge B and compare their reactions to identical fact
patterns, which could then be used to compute the correlation between their
decisions. A few studies did administer such surveys in the 1970s and early
1980s,170 but to my knowledge, no recent disparity study has sought to
measure the correlation of judges’ decisions using surveys.
169 See Joshua B. Fischman, Measuring Inconsistency, Indeterminacy, and Error in Adjudication,
AM. L. & ECON. REV. ( f orthcoming Spring 2014) (manuscript at 6-20), available at
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/aht011?ijkey=
f68R7vaaKTMP3y0&keytype=ref (constructing bounds on interjudge inconsistency from judges’
rates of reaching different outcomes).
170 See ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (1974), available at
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This simple example involved only two judges and assumed that the
judges’ grant rates were known exactly. When there are more than two
judges, the relationship between grant rates and inconsistency becomes far
more complex.171 Complex statistical problems arise when judges’ grant
rates are not known precisely, but must be inferred from judges’ decisions
in actual cases.172
C. Determinacy and Correctness
The concept of interjudge consistency was defined without reference to
the content of law or any substantive conception of justice. This makes
inconsistency easier to conceptualize but also limits its utility as a normative
metric. Inconsistency may be most important in settings where predictability is paramount and correctness is a secondary concern. As Justice Brandeis
wrote, it is sometimes “more important that the applicable rule of law be
settled than that it be settled right.”173 But in many settings, assessing
whether a system of adjudication satisfies the requirements of law and
justice may be more important than whether it provides consistent results.174
Any attempt to measure whether decisions are correct or just will typically require addressing concepts that are not objectively measureable, at
least whenever the meaning of law or the requirements of justice are
disputed. Nevertheless, it is possible to make limited objective claims about
correctness on the basis of empirical data. Consider, for example, one
finding by Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein in a study of circuit court cases
reviewing administrative agency decisions for arbitrariness: judges who are
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/2dcrstdy.pdf/$file/2dcrstdy.pdf (analyzing the results
from a survey of district judges on sentencing severity); Kevin Clancy et al., Sentence Decisionmaking: The Logic of Sentence Decisions and the Extent and Sources of Sentence Disparity, 72 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 524 (1981) (same); Shari Seidman Diamond & Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A
Study of Sentence Disparity and Its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 109 (1975) (analyzing sentences
issued in districts that used sentencing councils, in which judges shared preliminary sentence
recommendations for the same offenders). Some more recent studies have examined whether lay
respondents have similar rank ordering for criminal offenses. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Robert
Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829 (2007) ( f inding
that lay respondents largely agree about the relative seriousness of various criminal offenses).
171 See Fischman, supra note 169, at 14-15 (defining and stating bounds for inconsistency with
more than two judges).
172 See id. at 30-32 (deriving a method for making statistical inferences on inconsistency with
observational data).
173 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
174 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 181 (1986) (“Suppose we can rescue only some
prisoners of tyranny; justice hardly requires rescuing none even when only luck, not any principle,
will decide whom we save and whom we leave to torture.”).
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Republican appointees are 14% more likely than Democratic appointees to
vote to invalidate liberal agency decisions.175 Although this empirical result
cannot tell us how many of these agency decisions ought to have been
invalidated, Miles and Sunstein argue that the disparity itself provides
evidence of legal error: “We cannot rule out the possibility that one group
has it essentially right. But it is not possible that both groups have it
essentially right, and we suspect that errors can be found from both
sides.”176
This interpretation relies on the controversial premise that every case
has a unique correct outcome. Under this assumption, if Democrat- and
Republican-appointed judges would disagree in at least 14% of cases reviewing liberal agency decisions, then one side or the other must be wrong. This
conclusion is justified even if we cannot know when Democrats and Republicans would disagree or which judges would be wrong. Since half of these
cases, on average, would be decided by judges who are correct and half by
judges who are wrong, we can expect that at least 7% of these cases will be
wrongly decided.
Although Miles and Sunstein have situated studies such as theirs within
a “New Legal Realism,”177 there are important differences between their
normative premises and those of the legal realists, who emphatically
rejected the notion that the law was always determinate.178 Miles and
Sunstein offer an important interpretation, but the notion that judges
should be evaluated on the basis of their adherence to “paper rules”179 is not
something that the legal realists would have endorsed.
Miles and Sunstein suggest an alternative interpretation of their results,
which is more in line with the realist perspective: studies such as theirs
“represent an effort to test certain intuitive ideas about the indeterminacy of
law.”180 If judicial disagreement is taken as evidence that the law fails to
provide a correct answer, then a 14% rate of disagreement between Democratic
175 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 761, 777 tbl.1 (2008) (comparing Democrat- and Republican-appointed circuit court
judges’ validation rates with respect to “liberal” agency decisions).
176 Id. at 807.
177 Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831
(2008).
178 See Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism (“The Realists famously argued that the law was
‘indeterminate.’”), in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 50, 51 (Martin P. Golding & William Edmundson eds., 2004).
179 See Llewellyn, supra note 4, at 448 (defining “[p]aper rules” as “the accepted doctrine of
the time and place—what the books there say ‘the law’ is,” in contrast to “real rules,” which are
“what the courts will do in a given case”).
180 Miles & Sunstein, supra note 177, at 834 (emphasis added).
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and Republican judges would mean that the outcome must be indeterminate
in at least 14% of these cases.181
Claims about indeterminacy and error can be viewed as alternative interpretations of statistical disparity. If judges would disagree about how
cases ought to be decided, then there must be some combination of legal
indeterminacy and judicial error. Decomposing disparities into combinations of indeterminacy and error turns out to be a rather complicated
statistical problem and still can only yield feasible combinations of indeterminacy and error rates.182 As with inconsistency, the problem becomes more
complicated with multiple judges and when grant rates must be inferred
from judges’ decisions.183 Any effort to reach more precise interpretations of
statistical disparity will necessarily require much stronger assumptions
about the degree of legal determinacy and about the correct answers to
various kinds of cases.184
D. Conclusion
Empirical studies on interjudge disparity have enormous potential for
improving the quality of systems of adjudication. In order to justify reform,
however, it is important for these studies to be precise about the values at
stake and how they are measured. If one wants to promote consistency, then
bureaucratic controls or even quotas would be an effective solution.185
Selecting more capable judges or providing better training, as some have
advocated,186 might reduce error rates but could not reduce legal indeterminacy.
All too often, these studies have simply reported the disparities and let
the audience reach judgments about the normative implications. The
relationships between the data and the relevant normative concepts are far
too complex, however, for intuition to be a reliable guide. Instead of
181 These disparities could be interpreted in terms of epistemic indeterminacy, meaning that
the law is not knowable to competent judges. See Ken Kress, A Preface to Epistemological Indeterminacy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 134, 138-39 (1990). They could also be interpreted as evidence of causal
indeterminacy, meaning that the law fails to cause judges to reach the correct outcome. See Brian
Leiter, Legal Indeterminacy, 1 LEGAL THEORY 481, 481-82 (1995).
182 See Fischman, supra note 169, at 21-27 (discussing how to determine feasible combinations
of indeterminacy and error rates from observational data).
183 See id. at 21-27
184 See id. at 27-28 (discussing how assumptions can sharpen inferences about indeterminacy
and error).
185 The fact that many scholars oppose such reforms in asylum adjudication suggests that
consistency is not actually their primary concern. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 27, at 379
(opposing bureaucratic controls and quotas).
186 See id. at 380-81.
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“letting the data speak,” we must start by focusing on the normative values
at stake, and develop methods that can give useful answers about whether
and how to reform legal institutions.
V. BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN ‘IS’ AND ‘OUGHT’
Parts II–IV of this Article criticized a variety of empirical studies for
failing to credibly reunite ‘is’ and ‘ought.’ Some studies sought to connect
their findings to prescriptive claims but never explained how the phenomena measured related to any normative concepts. Other studies reported a
variety of descriptive statistics without interpretation, placing the burden
on unsophisticated audiences to decipher the implications of the findings.
It would be easy to fault the authors of these studies for claiming too
much or for using flawed research designs. But the reality is that these
studies are not aberrations. Many of them employed methods that are
widely accepted in contemporary empirical legal studies, and several were
even published in prestigious peer-reviewed journals.
The fundamental problem is that empirical legal methodology lacks
frameworks for connecting empirical findings with normative conclusions.
In this Part, I consider steps that scholars can take to make empirical
research more relevant to the study of law. First, they should prioritize
normative questions, and be explicit about the values that motivate their
research. Second, they should allow substantive questions to drive their
choice of methods, and not the other way around. Third, they need to be
more explicit about how they are combining objective findings with contestable assumptions in order to reach normative conclusions. Finally, they
should think more carefully about how empirical findings generalize from a
research setting to a policy-relevant context.
A. Prioritizing Normative Goals
There is deep disagreement among legal scholars about whether and
how empirical legal research should be guided by normative goals. These
debates, of course, are not new. Llewellyn and Pound famously debated
whether the ‘is’ could be divorced from the ‘ought,’ but Llewellyn’s conception of a “temporary divorce” was controversial even among the legal
realists. Felix Cohen agreed that empirical research should be guided by
normative questions187 but shared Pound’s skepticism that ‘is’ and ‘ought’

187 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809, 849 (1935) (“Legal description is blind without the guiding light of a theory of values.”).
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could ever be separated.188 Others, such as Herman Oliphant and Underhill
Moore, believed that empirical scholars should simply engage in a valuefree description of the facts as they see them, without concern for any
normative objectives.189
The value-free approach to legal research was not successful for Oliphant and Moore, whose empirical research was widely derided as pointless.190 But their viewpoint is widely shared among contemporary
empiricists.191 There is much concern about keeping ‘is’ and ‘ought’ separate,192 but far less emphasis on reuniting them. Many non-empiricists,
however, have sharply criticized empirical legal scholarship for lacking
relevance to normative questions in legal scholarship.193
This is, of course, a normative debate about the objectives of empirical
legal scholarship. These commentators disagree about what constitutes good
scholarship and how best to produce it. Resolving these debates, therefore,
requires clarifying the goals of legal scholarship and considering how they
can be advanced by empirical research.

188 Id. (“The relation between positive legal science and legal criticism is not a relation of
temporal priority, but of mutual dependence.” (citing Pound, supra note 6)).
189 See Underhill Moore, Essay (“[U]ntil [precise knowledge of the specific effects of law on
behavior] is available, any discussion of the relative desirability of alternative social ends which
may be achieved by law is largely day-dreaming.”), in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF
SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 203, 206-07 ( J ulius Rosenthal Found. for Gen. L., Nw. U. ed.
1987) (1941); Herman Oliphant, Facts, Opinions, and Value-Judgments, 10 TEX. L. REV. 127, 137
(1932) (“[I]t is no evidence that a student of law is deficient in moral sense if he merely observes
and records the uniformities of social behavior with which the law is concerned . . . . It may, on
the contrary, be substantial evidence of his desire to get on with what is his proper job at least,
viz., to identify rather than to evaluate the social consequences of particular legal measures and
devices.”).
190 See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
191 See Theodore Eisenberg, The Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical Legal Studies and a
Response to Concerns, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1733 (“[S]tudies may be done largely because data
are available, but no apology is needed for doing so.”); Mark C. Suchman & Elizabeth Mertz,
Toward a New Legal Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal Realism, 6 ANN. REV. LAW
& SOC. SCI. 555, 574 (2010) (“[S]ome variants of the new legal empiricism often seem to be
motivated less by systematic arguments about fundamental social processes than by casual
curiosity, commonsense predictions, and readily available data.”).
192 See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 9 (2003)
(“Too much legal scholarship ignores the rules of inference and applies instead the ‘rules’ of
persuasion and advocacy.”).
193 See Barry Friedman, supra note 20, at 262-63 (“Oftentimes positive scholarship seems to
be struggling with the normative implications of its work only after the project is complete, if at
all. One sees indications of a ‘research now, justify later’ approach. . . . Normative bite ought to
define the problem, not be an afterthought.”); see also C. Edwin Baker, Viewpoint Diversity and
Media Ownership, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 651, 663 (2009) (“Policy is misled if it relies on what is
easy to measure rather than what is important.”).
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A comparison between law and other disciplines is instructive. The
natural sciences, for example, are primarily descriptive. As Edward Rubin
explains, “[T]he discourse of natural science . . . begins from the
premise that there is a real world ‘out there,’ separate from conscious
human control. Prescriptive statements about this world would be meaningless . . . .”194 The role of normativity in the social sciences, however,
remains controversial. As Rubin notes, some social scientists adopt the
descriptive orientation of the natural sciences, proceeding as though their
subject matter were “a fixed phenomenon, ‘out there’ beyond the control of
rational decision-makers.”195 Many social scientists reject this approach,
however, arguing that because the social sciences study institutions that
serve social values, research questions in these fields must have some
relevance to these values.196
Legal scholarship, like the social sciences, studies a social institution. An
essential feature of law, however, is its normativity;197 the law is developed
Edward L. Rubin, Law And and the Methodology of Law, 1997 WISC. L. REV. 521, 524.
Id. at 537. This detached perspective would accurately describe most quantitative research
in political science. See IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 2 (2003) (“Normative and explanatory theories of democracy grow out of literatures that proceed, for the most part,
on separate tracks, largely uninformed by one another.”); Robert A. Dahl, The Behavioral Approach
in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 763, 770771 (1961) (“The empirical political scientist is concerned with what is, as he says, not with what
ought to be.”); John Gerring & Joshua Yesnowitz, A Normative Turn in Political Science?, 38 POLITY
101, 102 (2006) (“Traditionally, the scientific study of politics has been associated with a valueneutral approach to politics. One seeks to uncover what is, not what ought to be, in the political
realm.”).
196 See, e.g., WILLIAM R. SHADISH ET AL., EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL
DESIGNS FOR GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE 476 (2002) (“Although scientists have
frequently avoided value questions in the mistaken belief that they cannot be studied scientifically
or that science is value free, we cannot avoid values even if we try. The conduct of experiments
involves values at every step, from question selection through the interpretation and reporting of
results.”); MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 21 (Edward A. Shils
& Henry A. Finch eds. & trans., 1949) (“The problems of the empirical disciplines are, of course,
to be solved ‘non-evaluatively.’ . . . But the problems of the social sciences are selected by the
value-relevance of the phenomena treated.”); Robert A. Dahl, Normative Theory, Empirical
Research, and Democracy (“Identifying a question that is important is a moral and normative issue,
not a scientific issue.”), in PASSION, CRAFT, AND METHOD IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 113, 134
(Gerardo L. Munck & Richard Snyder eds., 2007); Robert Merton, Technical and Moral Dimensions
of Policy Research (“The investigator may naively suppose that he is engaged in the value-free
activity of research, whereas in fact he may simply have so defined his research problems that the
results will be of use to one group in the society, and not to others. His very choice and definition
of a problem reflects his tacit values.”), in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 70 (1973); Gerring & Yesnowitz, supra note 195, at 112 (“Art for art’s
sake has some plausibility, and science for science’s sake might also be argued in a serious vein. But no
serious person would adopt as her thesis social science for social science’s sake. Social science is science
for society’s sake.”).
197 See Rubin, supra note 30 and accompanying text.
194
195
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consciously by human decisionmakers for the purpose of guiding human
conduct.198 Law has no fixed reality that can be described without an
understanding of its purposes.199 Rather, the law is continually evolving,
and one function of legal scholarship is to address how it ought to evolve.200
Even though empirical research is inherently descriptive, choices about
what legal phenomena to examine and what relationships to analyze require
evaluative judgments of importance.201 Scholars have advanced various
conceptions of importance, but all of these require some reference to values.
First, empirical research could be considered important if it can guide legal
reform, an assessment that necessarily requires a value judgment.202 Second,
empirical research may be important if it describes legal phenomena that
participants in the legal system find important—which would require
understanding their normative viewpoints.203
Finally, empirical research may be important if it contributes to the development of theories that can in turn guide legal reform or illuminate the

198 See Rubin, supra note 194, at 525 (“Modern legal scholars regard law as the product of
conscious decision by public decision-makers, and possibly others.”).
199 Although some classical formalists may have viewed law as being part of a fixed reality
“beyond the reach of conscious decision-makers,” virtually all contemporary legal scholars reject
this perspective. See id. Even these formalists, of course, recognized the normativity of law. See id.
200 See id. (“There is thus no fixed reality, but rather an ongoing process by which people in
certain positions make decisions; in bald terms, law is created, not discovered. This sentiment has
led to prescriptive efforts to improve the quality of those decisions according to the scholar’s own
views about law or public policy.”).
201 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 17 (2d ed. 2011) (“[A] judgment of significance and importance must be made if [a description of law] is to be more than a
vast rubbish heap of miscellaneous facts.”); Cohen, supra note 187, at 848 (“The prospect of
determining the consequences of a given rule of law appears to be an infinite task . . . unless we
approach it with some discriminating criterion of what consequences are important.”); Pound, supra
note 6, at 697 (“[A] science of law must be something more than a descriptive inventory. There
must be selection and ordering of the materials so as to make them intelligible and useful.”).
202 See Cohen, supra note 187, at 848 (“[A] criterion of importance presupposes a criterion of
values”).
203 See ANDREI MARMOR, POSITIVE LAW AND OBJECTIVE VALUES 157 (2001) (“[A]n understanding of a normative social practice, like law . . . must comprise an understanding of its
points, that is, of the values which would render the participants’ beliefs in their reasons for action
intelligible.”); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 295 (“The explanation of human behavior
related to law has to take account of the way people’s beliefs about the law, normatively understood, affect their behavior”); Pound, supra note 6, at 700 (“Faithful portrayal of what courts and
law makers and jurists do is not the whole task of a science of law. One of the conspicuous
actualities of the legal order is the impossibility of divorcing what they do from the question what
they ought to do or what they feel they ought to do.”); Leslie Green, Law and the Causes of Judicial
Decisions
33
(Oxford
Legal
Research
Paper
Series
2009),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/id=1374608 (endorsing Hans Kelsen’s view that “if [the sociology of law]
was to touch its intended subject, [it] would have to study beliefs and actions oriented towards
legal norms as identified by jurisprudence”).
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legal system to its participants.204 Certainly, such research need not have a
direct normative payoff; a study may examine phenomena that seem narrow
and unimportant, but the findings may generalize to a wide variety of
contexts. Assessing what theories are useful, however, still requires a valueladen judgment; a theory that can only explain insignificant phenomena
cannot itself be significant.
Empirical research may thus seek to advance an immediate policy prescription, to describe the legal system in a meaningful way, or to contribute
to theory development. In any of these pursuits, however, the importance
of the research must be assessed by reference to values. This is not to say
that empiricists must personally take controversial positions in normative
debates; one can acknowledge the viewpoints held by others without
endorsing them. It is not too much to ask, however, that empirical research
proceed in a conscious recognition of the values it intends to serve, and that
scholars make efforts to clarify how their findings relate to the values that
motivated their research.
B. Rethinking Empirical Legal Methodology
The studies criticized in Parts II–IV had worthy motivations, but they
struggled to credibly connect their results to normative claims. As these
discussions showed, the relationship between measureable objects and
normative concepts is often complex. Because legal scholarship lacks its own
empirical methodology, empiricists typically adhere to the methods of other
disciplines, irrespective of whether they are suited to address the questions
of legal scholarship.
Empirical legal methodology needs to be more closely tethered to the
motivating questions in legal scholarship. Because the method used determines the question that is answered, the evaluation of methods and questions cannot be disentangled. Yet scholars have too often allowed the choice
of method to determine the question that is asked, rather than having the
substantive question determine the choice of method.
A 2002 critique of empirical legal scholarship by political scientists Lee
Epstein and Gary King is often taken as representing the dominant view on
empirical legal methodology. Declaring that the “state of empirical legal

204 David Collier et al., Critiques, Responses, and Trade-offs: Drawing Together the Debate
(“[S]tudies that help advance theory in a way that gives scholars new leverage in conceptualizing
and explaining significant outcomes would also be considered important.”), in RETHINKING
SOCIAL INQUIRY: DIVERSE TOOLS, SHARED STANDARDS 125, 127 (Henry E. Brady & David
Collier eds., 2010).
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scholarship [was] deeply flawed,”205 they criticized legal scholars for their
inattention to methodological concerns206 and emphasized the need to
develop empirical methods that were tailored to questions that arise in legal
scholarship.207
Although Epstein and King were right about the need for an empirical
legal methodology, they never explained why existing methodologies were
inadequate. In fact, the bulk of their article was devoted to criticizing
empirical legal scholars for failing to comply with standards that had been
established in other disciplines. Of course, empirical methodologies need not
be trapped within disciplinary boundaries, and many methods from other
disciplines have proven useful in empirical legal studies.
Yet all too often, discussions of empirical legal methodology have been
divorced from discussions of substantive questions. Even Epstein and King
had little to say about the objectives of empirical legal scholarship.208 In a
brief section entitled “The Research Question,” Epstein and King advocated
a permissive approach toward research questions that sharply contrasted
with their demanding rules for every other aspect of empirical scholarship.209 They provided two criteria for research questions: “they contribute to
existing knowledge and they have some importance for the real world.”210 But the
first criterion is nearly vacuous—how much research does not contribute in
some way to existing knowledge?—and the meaning of “importance” in the
second criterion was never articulated.211 Epstein and King even declared
these criteria to be entirely optional.212 In their view, it is appropriate for
“[i]nvestigators [to] conduct rigorous empirical research about any question,
no matter how narrow it may be, no matter whether they are the only ones

Epstein & King, supra note 192, at 6 (emphasis omitted).
See id. at 11 (“[T]he complete list of all law review articles devoted to improving, understanding, explicating, or adapting the rules of inference is as follows: none.”).
207 See id. at 11 (“The law is important enough to have a subfield devoted to methodological
concerns, as does almost every other discipline that conducts empirical research. Scholars toiling
in the social, natural, and physical sciences can help, but a whole field cannot count on others with
differing goals and perspectives to solve all of the problems that law professors may face.”).
208 See Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69
U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 154 (2002) (“The reader of Epstein and King’s 133-page article will find
almost nothing that speaks to the simple question, ‘What is legal scholarship for?’”).
209 See Epstein & King, supra note 192, at 55-61.
210 Id. at 55.
211 With regard to the second criterion, they write, “This is a rule about which we need not
say too much.” Id. at 60.
212 See id. at 55 (writing that it “is not particularly problematic” that “many questions asked
by academics and others about legal phenomena do not meet these standards”).
205

206
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interested in it, no matter if it has virtually no implications for the real
world.”213
Of course, Epstein and King were not actually advocating the pursuit of
trivial questions. Nevertheless, by leaving the criteria of importance unexamined, they undermined their call for more rigorous methods in empirical
legal research. Different methodological approaches will yield different
estimates of causal or correlational relationships among observable variables. Any of these estimates can be rationalized as the answer to some
research question, if perhaps an unimportant one. Evaluating empirical
methods therefore requires some assessment of fit between statistical
estimates that can be generated and important substantive research questions. This, in turn, requires criteria for determining what is an important
question.
When standards for research questions are left unarticulated, it is all too
tempting to allow the availability of data to define the research question.214
Without some criterion of importance, one can start with a data set, apply a
preferred statistical technique, and then rationalize a research question that
is answered by the resulting estimate.215 This may seem perverse, but it is in
fact an inevitable consequence of a mindset that prioritizes adherence to
methodological “rules” over normative relevance. If we combine exacting
standards for deriving inferences from data with lax standards for relating
those inferences to normative questions, there will be an inevitable pressure
to reorient empirical research projects around phenomena that are conveniently measured and analyzed, rather than those that can genuinely inform
policymaking. This leads to misplaced efforts at empirical sophistication,
such as projects that explain the impact of judicial characteristics on citation
counts using fixed-effects negative binomial regression with clustered

213 Id. at 55 (emphasis added). They do provide the caveat that “posing research questions in
ways that attract the interest of others . . . is good career advice.” Id.
214 See Friedman, supra note 20, at 262 (“[T]he temptation is great to rest on what data is
readily available, allowing that to define the questions that are asked and the way in which they
are answered.”); Brian Leiter, On So-Called “Empirical Legal Studies” and Its Problems, BRIAN
LEITER’S L. SCH. REPS. ( J uly 6, 2010), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2010/07/onsocalled-empirical-legal-studies.html (“[T]oo much of the work is driven by the existence of a data
set, rather than an intellectual or analytical point.”).
215 Cf. CHARLES F. MANSKI, PUBLIC POLICY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: ANALYSIS AND
DECISIONS 71 (2013) (criticizing reporting of the effects of an offer to treat patients where the
effects of actual treatment should be the parameter of interest); Angus Deaton, Instruments,
Randomization, and Learning About Development, 48 J. ECON. LIT. 424, 429 (2010) (criticizing the
use of instrumental variables where the availability of an instrument—rather than the research
question—determines the parameter of interest).
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standard errors216 or studies that predict reversals using multilevel hierarchical models and overdispersed logistic regression.217 Defining citation
counts or reversal rates as objects of interest may create an illusion of
credibility, but it does not bring empirical research any closer to providing
useful information that can improve the legal system.
There are many ways in which methodology can evolve to address questions unique to legal scholarship. In the following Sections, I briefly discuss
two. First, because many meaningful legal phenomena cannot be objectively
verified, empirical legal methodology will need to accommodate subjective
phenomena. Second, because of the limitations of experimental approaches,
legal empiricists will need to develop theories and methods that allow
findings to generalize to diverse contexts.
C. Accommodating Subjective Phenomena
The studies of citation counts, reversal rates, and interjudge disparities
discussed in Parts II–IV were all motivated by values internal to law, such
as good judging and correctness. Such values have two important features in
common: they are abstract and subjective. One can verify the contents of
legal texts and judicial opinions, but the correctness of legal decisions and
the quality of judicial reasoning will inevitably be disputed.
Many methodological approaches in empirical social science seek to
avoid consideration of abstract concepts.218 Although there are many
advantages to concreteness in empirical research, such an approach is not
always appropriate for addressing normative questions about law. Because
many of the important normative goals are inherently subjective, any
methodological approach that limits its focus to objectively measurable
phenomena will have nothing to say about these goals. As Pound argued to
Llewellyn,
Those who long for an exact science analogous to mathematics or physics or
astronomy have been inclined to seek exactness by excluding [the question
of how justice ought to be administered] from jurisprudence altogether. But

216 See Choi et al., supra note 24, at 515-16 (examining the relationship between a judge’s
gender and citation counts).
217 See, e.g., Gelman et al., supra note 124 (studying death sentence reversals).
218 See, e.g., GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 109 (1994) (urging empirical social scientists to “maximize concreteness” and to “choose observable, rather than unobservable, concepts whenever possible”); id. at 111
(“If we have no alternative to using unobservable constructs . . . then we should at least choose
ideas with observable consequences.”).
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such a jurisprudence has only an illusion of reality. For the significant question is the one excluded.219

There can be no “exact science” of law. The legal empiricist’s goal
should not be to generate objective, assumption-free conclusions; there are
few such conclusions that matter. Rather, legal empiricists need to find
ways to combine objective findings with unverifiable assumptions to
generate conclusions that are meaningful—at least according to some
viewpoints—and to be explicit about how the assumptions are driving the
results.
D. Emphasizing Generalizable Results
Empirical research examines what occurred in the past, but policymaking addresses what ought to be done in the future. To be relevant to
normative questions, empirical research cannot merely explain what happened in the past, but must also interpret findings in ways that can inform
decisions going forward. The normative goals of a research project will
determine the extent to which the findings must be generalized to other
contexts, which in turn will drive the study design.
Extrapolation may be unnecessary in a few instances, such as in research
that examines purely historical questions. A study that sought to determine
the authorship of the disputed Federalist Papers,220 for example, had clear
relevance to legal scholarship without any need to generalize the findings to
other contexts. In other settings, what ought to be done in the future may
depend directly on what happened in the past. In litigation, for example,
whether the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury may directly determine
whether the court ought to hold the defendant liable. To the extent that
empirical research can shed light on such causal questions, it can provide
direct guidance to legal decisionmakers without any need for generalizability.
Sometimes, extrapolating from the past to the future may be straightforward. If a drug proved effective in a well-controlled clinical trial, for
instance, one might reasonably expect that it will have a similar effect in a
comparable population in the future. In this setting, a simple comparison of
the average effect on the treatment and control groups might be sufficient to
determine whether the drug ought to be prescribed in the future.

Pound, supra note 6, at 703.
See Frederick Mosteller & David L. Wallace, Inference in an Authorship Problem, 302 J.
AM. STAT. ASS’N 275 (1963).
219

220
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Even this simple example, however, relies on several critical assumptions. First, it assumes that the impact of the medical treatment does not
vary over time, so that the effect observed in the past accurately predicts the
effect that will occur in the future. This may seem self-evident in the
context of many medical trials, but it is less obvious in field research in law
and the social sciences. Second, the example assumes that it was feasible to
conduct a well-controlled trial with a study population that was representative of the target population. Third, it assumes that the measureable
outcome has direct normative significance, so that a comparison of outcomes would provide sufficient information to guide policy. Fourth, it
assumes that for normative purposes, we are only interested in the average
effect of the treatment, and not any distributional effects.221
When these assumptions are satisfied, there is little concern about
whether the results are generalizable, and researchers should design studies
to have high internal validity.222 When the assumptions do not hold,
however, it is necessary to use research designs that provide both internal
and external validity.223 This necessarily requires making assumptions about
how the results can be extrapolated.224
Many methodological differences among the disciplines stem from the
plausibility of the above assumptions as applied to research questions within
the respective disciplines. Some statisticians and social scientists have emphasized internal validity over external validity,225 while many econometricians

221 See James J. Heckman, The Scientific Model of Causality, 35 SOC. METHODOLOGY 1, 20-21
(2005) (noting that standard statistical approaches that rely on randomization only estimate
average treatment effects, and not distributional effects). Experimental studies can examine
whether average effects vary among identifiable groups, but this would only capture part of the
overall distributional impact.
222 A study design has “internal validity” if it “successfully uncovers causal effects for the
population being studied.” JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 151 (2009).
223 A study design has “external validity” if the findings have predictive value in other contexts. See id.
224 See MANSKI, supra note 215, at 30-31 (describing the need for assumptions in extrapolating empirical findings and criticizing researchers who use untenable assumptions); Christopher A.
Sims, But Economics Is Not an Experimental Science, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 59, 60 (2010) (“We are
always combining the objective information in the data with judgment, opinion and/or prejudice
to reach conclusions.”).
225 See, e.g., PAUL R. ROSENBAUM, DESIGN OF OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES 56-57 (2010)
(“The common view, which I share, is that internal validity comes first.” (endnote omitted));
Donald T. Campbell, Factors Relevant to the Validity of Experiments in Social Settings, 54 PSYCH.
BULL. 297, 310 (1957) (“If one is in a situation where either internal validity or representativeness
must be sacrificed, which should it be? The answer is clear. Internal validity is the prior and
indispensable consideration.”).
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have argued that both are essential.226 Many economists insist that empirical findings must be interpreted in the context of a theoretical framework,227
while some statisticians advocate reporting facts with minimal interpretation.228 Much of the difference in perspectives stems from the fact that
economics is primarily an observational science, while statistics is more
oriented toward an experimental paradigm.229 In medical research, treatments are typically tested in controlled trials and results may be easily
extrapolated to other contexts. In such settings, simple comparisons between control and treatment groups may suffice. By contrast, economists
are more often interested in forecasting the effects of policy interventions
that cannot be implemented in advance,230 which requires models than can
predict what will happen under untestable counterfactuals.
The nature of theory required for extrapolating findings also varies by
context. Toxicologists, for example, sometimes need to estimate the impact
of exposure to minuscule amounts of environmental pollutants. When the
impacts of such exposure are too small to be reliably measured in a controlled trial or an observational study, scientists and policymakers must
226 See, e.g., MANSKI, supra note 215, at 37 (arguing that both internal and external validity
are important goals of research design); Deaton, supra note 215, at 447-52 (same); Heckman, supra
note 221, at 8 (same).
227 See Heckman, supra note 221, at 5 (“Blind empiricism unguided by a theoretical framework for interpreting facts leads nowhere.”); Tjalling C. Koopmans, Measurement Without Theory,
29 REV. ECON. & STAT. 161, 162 (1947) (advocating “[f]uller utilization of the concepts and
hypotheses of economic theory . . . as a part of the processes of observation and measurement”).
228 See A.P. Dawid, Causal Inference Without Counterfactuals, 95 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 407, 407
(2000) (“Nature is surely utterly indifferent to our attempts to ensnare her in our theories.”).
229 See Guido W. Imbens, An Economist’s Perspective on Shadish (2010) and West and Thoemmes (2010), 15 PSYCHOL. METHODS 47, 48 (2010) (“Unlike biostatisticians, who often start
from the perspective of a randomized clinical trial, economists start with the notion that individuals receive the treatments they received because they choose to.”); Guido W. Imbens & Jeffrey
Wooldridge, Recent Developments in the Econometrics of Program Evaluation, 47 J. ECON. LIT. 5, 1920 (2009) (noting that in biostatistics, randomized experiments “are often viewed as the only
credible approach to establishing causality,” but that randomization “has played a much less
prominent role” in economics and has “rarely been viewed as the sole method for establishing
causality”); Sims, supra note 224, at 59 (“[E]conomics is not an experimental science and cannot
be.”). Nonetheless, many economists have been moving toward the experimental paradigm, and
the use of laboratory and field experiments has grown dramatically in recent years. See ANGRIST
& PISCHKE, supra note 222, at 12 (noting a trend toward randomized experimentation beginning
in the 1980s).
230 See Heckman, supra note 221, at 17 (“Forecasting the effects of new policies is a central
task of science and public policy analysis that the treatment effect literature ignores.”); Imbens,
supra note 229, at 48 (noting that economists often ask causal questions regarding the effects of
novel treatments); Aviv Nevo & Michael D. Whinston, Taking the Dogma Out of Econometrics:
Structural Modeling and Credible Inference, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 69, 71 (2010) (advocating the use of
structural modeling to “provide a way to extrapolate observed responses to environmental changes
to predict responses to other not-yet-observed changes”).
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extrapolate from studies involving higher degrees of exposure. Often, the
assumption is simply that there is a linear relationship between exposure to
the pollutant and the likelihood of adverse health outcomes.231 Here, the
marginal effect of the pollutant is assumed to be constant within some
relevant range, so that a measured marginal effect from one study is asserted
to generalize to lower levels of exposure.
By contrast, economists often need more complex models to credibly
extrapolate empirical findings to new contexts. Economists evaluating a
proposed merger, for example, cannot feasibly test the effects of the merger
using a controlled experiment. They could estimate the effects of past
mergers, but such estimates may not reliably predict the effect of a future
merger because firms have unique characteristics and industries are continually in flux.232 Econometric studies of past data may reveal the structure of
supply and demand in various markets, but economists must also rely on
economic theory and game theoretic models of firm competition to predict
how the proposed merger would affect the future behavior of firms and
consumers.233
Recently, many scholars have advocated greater use of randomized trials
in empirical legal research,234 and some have conducted innovative field
experiments that randomize legal representation235 and law enforcement.236
231 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
164 (2002) (describing a decision by the Environmental Protection Agency to assume a linear
relationship between arsenic exposure and cancer rates and arguing that the “assumption of
linearity is not based on science . . ., but on a policy judgment, designed to err on the side of
protecting health”); Adam M. Finkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky
Prescriptions of Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 341-45 (1994) (arguing that the
assumption of a linear relationship between exposure to carcinogens and cancer rates has a strong
scientific basis).
232 See Nevo & Whinston, supra note 230, at 73-75 (describing the difficulties of using the
causal effects of past mergers to predict the impact of future mergers).
233 See id. at 75 (describing the use of economic models to predict the impact of mergers).
234 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (2011)
(arguing that policymakers and governments should test laws and regulations with randomized
trials); D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal
Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2127
(2012) (“[R]andomized trials . . . can provide credible answers on a far wider range of questions
than is currently appreciated.”); D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance:
A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV.
901, 956 (2013) (“We believe such direct, randomized comparisons should be pursued, as they
represent a powerful way to assess whether judicial best practices change case outcomes, litigant
perceptions, and other outcomes of import.”).
235 See, e.g., W. VAUGHAN STAPLETON & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH:
A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 49-51 (1972) (describing
the study design for a randomized trial measuring the impact of counsel in juvenile hearings);
Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 234 (using randomization to evaluate the effects of an offer of
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Although such experiments have the potential to offer credible estimates of
the effects of various interventions, there are serious practical and ethical
constraints on intentional randomization in the legal process.237 These
constraints are most acute for studies of adjudication, where randomization
would be in deep tension with the need for reasoned decisionmaking.238
Some studies exploit naturally occurring sources of randomness within the
legal system,239 but because natural experiments are not designed with
research objectives in mind, scholars must exercise judgment in extrapolating
the results to policy questions of interest. Even the most careful randomized
legal representation from a law school clinic on outcomes in hearings for unemployment benefits);
Greiner et al., supra note 234 (using randomization to evaluate the effects of an offer of legal
representation in housing cases); Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for
Poor Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 419 (2001) (using randomization to evaluate a legal assistance program for low-income
tenants in New York City).
236 See Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for
Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 261 (1984) (randomizing arrests of domestic violence suspects
to estimate the impact of arrest on recidivism).
237 See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW: REPORT OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW 2530 (1981) (cataloging ethical issues inherent in randomizing legal experiments); Phyllis Jo
Baunach, Random Assignment in Criminal Justice Research: Some Ethical and Legal Issues, 17 CRIMINOLOGY 435 (1980) (discussing ethical and legal concerns, such as arbitrary assignment and
potential denial of benefits); Edna Erez, Randomized Experiments in Correctional Context: Legal,
Ethical, and Practical Concerns, 14 J. CRIM. JUST. 389, 391-92 (1986) (surveying ethical issues
associated with random assignment in criminal justice studies); Pascoe Pleasence, Trials and
Tribulations: Conducting Randomized Experiments in a Socio-legal Setting, 35 J.L. & SOC’Y 8, 24-26
(2008) (discussing several ethical concerns of random control trials, such as the denial of benefits
and compulsory participation); see also Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 234, at 2127-32 (arguing
that legal ethics permits randomization of an offer of legal representation but not randomization of
the actual use of representation).
238 Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 840-41 (1984) (describing condemnation of a
judge who flipped a coin to determine a defendant’s sentence); Adam M. Samaha, Randomization
in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5 (2009) (“[J]udges strongly condemn randomization
for their own merits decisions.”).
239 See David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case Assignment to Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1145 (2007) (exploiting the random
assignment of public defenders in felony cases to estimate the impact of attorney performance);
James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect of
Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154 (2012) (exploiting the random
assignment of defense attorneys to assess the performance of public defenders relative to
appointed counsel in murder cases); Donald P. Green & Daniel Winik, Using Random Judge
Assignments to Estimate the Effects of Incarceration and Probation on Recidivism Among Drug Offenders,
48 CRIMINOLOGY 357 (2010); Jeffrey R. Kling, Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings, 96
AM. ECON. REV. 863, 865-66 (2006) (exploiting the random assignment of judges to estimate the
impact of incarceration on subsequent labor market outcomes); see also supra notes 156-158 and
accompanying text (describing studies that examine the impact of randomly assigned judges on
case outcomes).
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trials can be compromised by subject attrition,240 crossover between the
treatment and control groups,241 spillover effects,242 or even conscious
efforts by nonparticipants to undermine the research.243 As Angus Deaton
writes,
[C]onducting good [randomized controlled trials] is exacting and often expensive, so that problems often arise that need to be dealt with by various
econometric or statistical fixes. There is nothing wrong with such fixes in
principle . . . but their application takes us out of the world of ideal [randomized controlled trials] and back into the world of everyday econometrics
and statistics.244

The use of randomized trials is a welcome development in empirical
legal scholarship, but many important research questions cannot be resolved
with standard experimental methods. To address such questions, there is no
alternative but to rely on theory, contestable assumptions, and empirical
estimates that can be extrapolated from other contexts.
For example, it would be difficult to estimate the effects of proposed
sentencing guidelines through a randomized trial. One could examine past
changes in sentencing guidelines, but this would not necessarily predict the
impact of future guidelines; the guidelines at issue might not be identical,
the composition of the judiciary would have changed, and mandatory
minimum penalties might be different. Any effort to predict the effect of
future policies would require a model of judicial sentencing behavior that
enables results from prior studies to be generalized to new contexts.

240 See Abramowicz et al., supra note 234, at 957-59 (noting that attrition “may bias experimental results when the attrition rate depends on selection for treatment”).
241 See id. at 959-60 (discussing the problems related to crossover, such as those that occur
“if well-connected people . . . thwart random assignment.”).
242 See id. at 960 (discussing how a controlled trial can be contaminated by spillover effects if
the control group is also influenced by the treatment); Edward Miguel & Michael Kremer, Worms:
Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the Presence of Treatment Externalities, 72 ECONOMETRICA 159, 160 (2004) (“[I]f externalities benefit the comparison group, outcome differences
between the treatment and comparison groups will understate the benefits of treatment on the
treated.”).
243 See Richard D. Schwartz, Foreword to STAPLETON & TEITELBAUM, supra note 235, at xii
(noting judicial opposition to Stapleton and Teitelbaum’s randomized study of representation in
juvenile delinquency hearings); Dave Hoffman, Experiments in Lawyering: Does the Harvard Legal
Aid Bureau Deserve a Merit Badge?, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Dec. 21, 2010),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/
archives/2010/12/experiments-in-lawyering-does-the-harvard-legal-aid-clinic-deserves-a-meritbadge.html (describing how a legal services organization stopped referring clients to Harvard
Legal Aid Bureau due to the Bureau’s participation in a randomized trial).
244 Deaton, supra note 215, at 447.
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In addition, as I have emphasized throughout this Article, the measureable outcomes in empirical legal research often do not have direct normative
significance. Although a randomized trial can provide a credible estimate of
the average effect of an intervention, this estimate may not be meaningful if
the underlying outcome variable lacks normative significance. Finally, legal
scholars are not merely interested in the average effects of treatments, but
also distributional effects; the degree to which likes are treated alike245, for
example, cannot be assessed by estimating the average effect of any legal
policy.246
The diverse research questions in empirical legal scholarship will almost
certainly require diverse methods. Simple methods may be most appropriate in some settings and more technical approaches in others. But the
methods used in empirical legal scholarship should be determined by
substantive research questions, not the other way around.
CONCLUSION
Pound and Llewellyn shared a worthy goal: using empirical social science to improve the law. Both understood that social scientists must engage
with values in order to advance legal reform. They disagreed sharply about
values, but at least they were debating the right questions.
The legal realists and sociological jurists never succeeded in establishing
empirical research within the mainstream of legal scholarship. Now, contemporary scholars are bringing new energy to the empirical study of the
legal system. They have been steadily improving in methodological sophistication, but in the process, they have lost much of their connection with
law’s normativity. All too often, research into what is fails to inform debates
about what ought to be.
This Article has argued that empirical legal scholars must clarify the
normative issues at stake in their research and be more explicit about the
asserted connections between measurable data and normative claims. Doing
this well will require careful thinking about the questions that animate
empirical legal research and the development of new frameworks and
methods that can provide meaningful answers. This is no doubt a challenging task. But if empirical studies lose sight of the goals of legal scholarship,
what will the counting be good for?

245
246

See supra Section IV.B.
See supra note 221 and accompanying text.

